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SEVERABILITY
JOHN COPELAND NAGLE*
When a court holds a provision of a statute unconstitutional,
a question remains regarding the validity of the remainder of the
statute. The court may find that the unconstitutional provision
may be severed from the statute and leave the remainder of the
statute in effect. Alternatively, the court may hold that the uncon-
stitutional provision cannot be severed and invalidate the entire
statute.
In this Article, attorney John Nagle argues that the jurispru-
dence surrounding the issue of severability is confusing and in-
consistent. After explaining the concept of severability and its
ramifications for statutes, Mr. Nagle traces the development of
the current judicial test for determining when a statute should be
found severable. The effect of severability clauses-statutory
provisions directing courts to leave the remainder of the statute in
effect in the event a provision is found unconstitutonal-is also
discussed; Mr. Nagle finds that such clauses do not necessarily
cause a court to reach a particular result. Mr. Nagle then exam-
ines the question of legislative intent in the context of severability.
He concludes that courts have departed from established methods
of determining legislative intent, opting instead to attempt to an-
swer the hypothetical question whether the legislature would have
chosen to enact the remaining parts of the statute without the un-
constitutional provision.
Because the current jurisprudence of severability is unset-
tled, Mr. Nagle asserts that courts should follow several general
principles regarding severability. First, courts should apply a
plain meaning rule to severability clauses, so that a statute con-
taining such a clause will automatically be considered severable.
Second, when a statute does not contain a severability clause, the
courts should look to the history, purpose, and structure of the
statute to ascertain legislative intent. Finally, to assist in this in-
quiry Mr. Nagle advocates the creation of a legislatively-enacted
clear statement rule requiring that courts consider a statute sev-
erable when a statute is silent on the issue of severability.
* Attorney, United States Department of Justice. B.A. 1982, Indiana University; J.D. 1986,
University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful for the comments and ideas shared by Barbara
Armacost, Abner Greene, David Leitch, Mike Paulsen, Lowell Sturgill, and Deanell Tacha, and
for the thoughts, comments and encouragement of my wife Lisa. The views expressed here are
my own; they do not necessarily represent the position of the Department of Justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Severability is usually an afterthought, a sifting through the statutory
rubble to salvage whatever survives a ruling that part of a law is unconstitu-
tional. The question that severability poses is easily stated: If part of a
statute is unconstitutional, does the rest of the statute remain in effect? The
question is also ubiquitous. It can arise any time part of a statute or a par-
ticular application of a statute is held unconstitutional. Moreover, the an-
swer can have profound consequences. Concluding that statutory
provisions are severable presents the danger of leaving in effect statutory
provisions that the legislature would have never enacted alone. Alterna-
tively, a holding of nonseverability can mean, for example, that an entire
appropriations statute or sweeping reform legislation falls because of a sin-
gle unconstitutional provision.'
Yet severability is often overlooked. The severability test currently
used by the Supreme Court was first stated in 1932,2 and the seminal article
on severability was written in 1937.1 Fifty-one years after the test was first
1. "mhe entire continuing resolution appropriating funds for the federal government for
fiscal year 1988 would have fallen" if an unconstitutional rider had not been severed by the court
in News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1988). J. Gregory Sidak &
Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L.
REv. 437,477 (1990); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,411 n.3 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (questioning the propriety of invalidating the entire public broadcasting funding
scheme because of an unconstitutional condition), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984). Deci-
sions holding broad reform legislation unconstitutional and nonseverable include Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316 (1936) (invalidating New Deal legislation) and Carrollton-Farmers
Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489,524 (Tex. 1992) (invali-
dating school finance reform statute); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 255 (1976) (Burger,
C.L, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that campaign contributions provisions of
the Federal Election Campaign Act should have fallen with unconstitutional expenditure
provisions).
2. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comn'n, 286 U.S. 210,234 (1932) (declining to con-
sider the constitutionality of a provision in an Oklahoma statute authorizing price regulation of
crude oil because it was severable from the provisions applied to the plaintiff), overruled by
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 (1950).
3. Robert L. Stem, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARv.
L. Rnv. 76 (1937). Stem continues to be acknowledged as the authority on severability. See
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Donovan, 766 F.2d 1550, 1559 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd, Alaska Air-
lines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1083-84 (Ct. Cl.
1977) (Skelton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
Commentators who analyzed severability before Stem include THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREA-nSE ON
THE CoNsTrrTUnoNAL LmrrATIONS WHIcH REsT UPON THE LEaIsLATIVE PowER op THE STATEs
oF Trm AMERicAN UNION 246-50 (Victor H. Lane ed., 7th ed. 1903); 1 J. G. SUTHNELAND, STAT-
tras AND STATUTORY CONSTRucrION 576-77 (John Lewis ed., 2d ed. 1904); Noel T. Dowling,
Dissection of Statutes, 18 A.B.A. J. 298 (1932); Alfred Hayes, Jr., Partial Unconstitutionality with
Special Reference to the Corporation Tax, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 120 (1911); see also infra notes 96
& 98 and accompanying text (discussing early academic commentary on severability clauses).
SEVERABILITY
enunciated, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha4 revived in-
terest in severability when the Court held that an unconstitutional legislative
veto over executive branch deportation decisions was severable from the
deportation power delegated to the executive branch.5 That decision pro-
voked a number of critical discussions of the test for determining severabil-
ity and its application to the nearly two hundred other statutes that
contained legislative vetoes.6 Four years later, the Court had an opportunity
to answer its critics in Alaska Airlines v. Brock,7 in which the severability
of the legislative veto in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was the only
issue before the Court.' A unanimous Court responded by keeping the
same basic test and holding another legislative veto severable.
Criticism of the Court's approach persists.9 The problem, as one court
recently put it, is that "[t]he test for severability has been stated often but
rarely explained."10 Thus, while severability is noncontroversial in many
cases because almost any test-including the Alaska Airlines test-would
produce the same result, hard cases illuminate the doctrinal inadequacy of
Alaska Airlines. Would unconstitutional restrictions on public funding of
art be severable from the funding itself? Is the unconstitutional legislative
veto severable from the rest of the War Powers Act? Would unconstitu-
4. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
5. Id. at 959.
6. For academic commentary on the severability of legislative vetoes, see, e.g., Robert L.
Glicksman, Severability and the Realignment of the Balance of Power Over the Public Lands:
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 After the Legislative Veto Decisions, 36
HASTINGS LJ. 1 (1984); Glenn C. Smith, From Unnecessary Surgery to Plastic Surgery: A New
Approach to the Legislative Veto Severability Cases, 24 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 397 (1987); Laurence
H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law By Any Other Name?, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 1
(1984); Angelo G. Garubo, Note, Severing the Legislative Veto Provision: The Aftermath of
Chadha, 21 CAL. W. L. REv. 174 (1984); Note, Severability of Legislative Veto Provisions: A
Policy Analysis, 95 HARv. L. R-v. 1182 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Severability]; Note, The After-
math of Chadha: The Impact of the Severability Doctrine on the Management of Intragovernmen-
tal Relations, 71 VA. L. REv. 1211 (1985) [hereinafter Note, The Aftermath of Chadha]. In
addition severability received considerable attention in congressional hearings after Chadha. See
The Supreme Court Decision in INS v. Chadha and its Implications for Congressional Oversight
and Agency Rulemaking: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmen-
tal Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. passim (1983) [hereinaf-
ter House Chadha Hearings]; Legislative Veto and the "Chadha' Decision: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. passim (1983) [hereinafter Senate Chadha Hearings].
7. 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
8. Id. at 678.
9. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO.
LJ. 523, 527 (1992) (criticizing the Alaska Airlines test as "unrealistic").
10. Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 1993); see also A.
Michael Froomkin, Climbing the Most Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence and the New Legal
Process, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1071, 1092 (1988) (book review) ("To this day, the Court has never
offered a constitutionally satisfactory explanation of its severability decisions.").
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tional conditions on a District of Columbia or Puerto Rico statehood act
invalidate the creation of a new state? The Alaska Airlines test does not
yield certain answers to these questions.
Alaska Airlines and other severability decisions properly focus on leg-
islative intent but search for that intent in the wrong way. Alaska Airlines
employs a decidedly non-textualist approach to deciding severability, even
as the Supreme Court in recent terms has usually adhered to a textualist
approach to statutory construction that emphasizes the plain meaning of the
statutory text. The goal of the severability analysis embodied by Alaska
Airlines has been to determine whether the legislature would have enacted
the statutory provisions that survive after another part of the statute is held
unconstitutional. By speculating about what the legislature would have in-
tended if it had considered the question of severability, rather than seeking
to determine what the legislature did intend as evidenced by the statute
itself, Alaska Airlines substitutes an unanswerable question for one applied
by the Court in most other statutory construction cases. Moreover, the
Court treats severability clauses as merely creating a presumption of sever-
ability and thus ignores the plain meaning of the clauses themselves. And
Alaska Airlines is unclear about what other presumptions inform severabil-
ity decisions, or how those presumptions relate to one another.
This Article posits that the Court's general approach to statutory con-
struction should also be applied to severability. If a statute contains a sev-
erability clause (or a nonseverability clause), such an explicit statement
should be construed according to its plain meaning. If the statutory text is
silent regarding severability, then the structure of the act, its purpose, and
the legislative history should be consulted, although such sources are often
inconclusive about severability. In addition, there should be a general rule
favoring severability. The best solution would be a legislatively enacted
clear statement rule providing that all statutes shall be construed as severa-
ble absent a specific nonseverability clause.
This Article shows how applying this approach can produce princi-
pled, predictable decisions about severability. Part II briefly explains the
concept of severability and introduces an illustrative case demonstrating
how severability works now and how it would work under the approach
presented in this Article. Next, Part III reviews the current test for sever-
ability and the haphazard manner in which it has developed. After examin-
ing why severability is a question of legislative intent in Part IV, Part V
argues that severability should be determined in accordance with the
Court's general approach to statutory construction.
206 [Vol. 72
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II. THE NATURE OF SEVERABILrrY
The severability question asks whether a court's holding that part of a
statute is invalid causes the remainder of the statute to be invalidated as
well. 1 Before considering how severability has been decided, it is helpful
to examine briefly when severability must be determined and what kinds of
severability questions arise. In re Blainey & Ontario Hockey Association, 2
a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeals, provides a good illustration of
these issues.
The facts are uniquely Canadian. A twelve-year old girl was prohib-
ited from playing on a boys' hockey team. She sued, claiming a violation
of section 1 of the Ontario Human Rights Code of 1981, which provided
that "'[elvery person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services,
goods and facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry ....
[or] sex."" 3 Section 19(2) of the Code provided, however, that section 1
is not violated "'where membership in an athletic organization or participa-
tion in an athletic activity is restricted to persons of the same sex.""'4 The
Ontario Court of Appeals held 2-1 that section 19(2) was unconstitutional
under the equal protection clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.' 5
The hockey association objected that "the Legislature would not have
passed section 1 of the Human Rights Code in its present language in the
absence of section 19(2)."I6 Rather than claiming that section 1 should fall
with section 19(2), the hockey association argued that because those provi-
sions could not be severed, both should be allowed to stand.' 7 The majority
rejected that argument, yet it failed to consider whether section 1 could
remain in effect after section 19(2) was invalidated."8 The dissent doubted
that section 19(2) was severable because "[tihere are too many qualifica-
11. The terms "severable," "separable," "divisible," and "elision" are used interchangeably.
As discussed infra at notes 129-30 and accompanying text, the metaphor suggested by the term
"severable" is probably misleading. "Separable" is a better choice, but the Article uses the term
severability because almost all courts and commentators now do so.
12. 26 D.L.RAth 728 (1986).
13. Id. at 734 (quoting Ontario Human Rights Code of 1981). Thae Code also prohibited
discrimination based on "'place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed[,] . . .age,
marital status, family status or handicap."' Id.
14. Id. at 735, 738 (quoting Ontario Human Rights Code of 1981).
15. Id. at 748. Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that
"'[elvery individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disabil-
ity."' Id. at 735 (quoting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
16. Id. at 747.
17. Id. at 746.
18. Id. at 747.
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tions in the Code to the anti-discrimination provision in s. 1 for any court to
assume that the legislature would have enacted the rest of the Code without
this and other limitations."19
Ontario Hockey Association is a good example of a case addressing
the issue of severability, but it is not the only example.20 Severability be-
comes an issue in different ways in different cases. For instance, severabil-
ity does not always involve the unconstitutionality of a statute. The issue of
severability also arises when legal texts other than statutes are held uncon-
stitutional21 and when statutes are invalid for reasons other than their un-
constitutionality.22 In addition, severability can be implicated in the
interpretation of commercial documents such as contracts and leases.2 3
Also, in contrast to Ontario Hockey Association, in which section 19(2) was
held invalid in all cases, a statutory provision may be invalid only in some
applications. The two situations can be viewed as involving severable lan-
guage (a specific provision of a statute is facially invalid) and severable
applications (part of a statute is invalid only when applied in certain
circumstances). 4
Severability issues can arise in many contexts. For example, sever-
ability becomes an issue when: (1) a party challenges an entire statute,
arguing that if any provision of the statute is unconstitutional and nonsever-
able, the rest of the statute is ineffective;5 (2) a party argues that a statutory
provision is invalid because it is nonseverable from another, purportedly
19. Id. at 753 (Finlayson, J., dissenting).
20. For a comprehensive, general discussion of the various types of severability cases, see 2
NoRMAN J. SiNGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION § 44 (C. Dallas Sands ed., 4th ed.
1986).
21. See, e.g., In re Reyes, 910 F.2d 611, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990) (executive order); see also
Michael S. Paulsen, The Constitutional Lessons of the 27th Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. (forthcom-
ing December 1993) (discussing severability of state applications for a constitutional convention).
22. See Carolyn McNiven, Comment, Using Severability Clauses to Solve the Attainment
Deadline Dilemma in Environmental Statutes, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1255, 1257 (1992) (advocating
reliance on severability principles when reviewing missed statutory deadlines for administrative
actions).
23. See, e.g., 5801 Assocs., Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1993) (ad-
dressing severability of maritime insurance contract).
24. See Stem, supra note 3, at 106. For an overview of the difference between the two situa-
tions, see SuTHmE.AxD, supra note 3, at 519-23, 527-28, 533-34. Most courts apply the same test
in both situations, although some would treat "severable applications" differently from "severable
language." See id at 482, 533; Stem, supra note 3 at 100-01, 114-15. This Article focuses on the
problem of severable language, although it views each situation as posing the same question and
therefore would apply the same test for determining severability in each case.
25. See, e.g., Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652-55 (1984); Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 81-84 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976); Guam Soc'y of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1369-70 (9th Cir.), modified, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 13490 (9th Cir. June 16, 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992).
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unconstitutional provision of the statute;26 (3) a party contends that an ap-
plication of a statutory provision is invalid because it is nonseverable from
other, unconstitutional applications of the statute;27 (4) a party argues that a
statute is nonseverable, and therefore, another party's constitutional chal-
lenge to a provision of the statute would preclude that party from receiving
any relief from other provisions of the statute;2" and (5) a party challenges a
statute as being either constitutionally underinclusive or overinclusive.29
This list is not exclusive, but it depicts some of the situations in which
severability becomes an issue in a case.30
26. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1987) (involving peti-
tioner who argued that statutory duty was invalidated because it could not be severed from an
unconstitutional legislative veto). By contrast, the hockey association's argument in Ontario
Hockey Ass'n that the nonseverability of the two contested provisions should cause them both to
remain in effect was plainly wrong: a holding of nonseverability should have invalidated both
provisions.
27. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 802-04 (1992) (setting out Oklahoma's
argument that legislation unconstitutionally favoring utilities in the state could be applied only to
state-run utilities); see also Robert A. Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertii: A Sub-
stantive Approach, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1308, 1323 (1982) ("[A] nonseverable law which is unconsti-
tutional as to some cannot ever be validly applied.").
28. In Chadha, for example, the government denied Chadha's standing to challenge the legis-
lative veto on the theory that the legislative veto was nonseverable from the provision authorizing
him to stay in the country, and therefore invalidation of the legislative veto would not provide him
any relief from his deportation order. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 415 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd,
462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also Consumer Energy Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
673 F.2d 425, 441 & n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that nonseverability would deny plaintiffs
relief), affd mem. sub nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463
U.S. 1216 (1983); House Chadha Hearings, supra note 6, at 161-62 (testimony of Alan Morrison)
(describing standing problem for someone challenging an arms sale under a statute with an uncon-
stitutional legislative veto provision).
29. As Judge Newman has explained:
A provision may be found to be underinclusive, thereby requiring a court to determine
whether the legislature, had it known it could not legislate in a limited fashion, would
have preferred to have no statute extended to apply to the impermissibly excluded
class.... Or, less frequently, a provision may be found to be overinclusive, thereby
requiring a court to determine whether the legislature, had it known it could not legislate
broadly, would have preferred to have no statute or to have the statute limited to apply
to all those except the impermissibly included class.
Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 527 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986); see also
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legisla-
tion, 28 Cxv. ST. L. Rev. 301 (1979) (discussing considerations in deciding whether to extend or
invalidate a benefit); Evan H. Caminker, Note, A Norm-Based Remedial Modelfor Underinclusive
Statutes, 95 YALE L.i. 1185, 1208 n.87 (1986) (discussing severability clauses as
"post-invalidation enactments of the prior legislative intent').
30. The question of when a party may raise a question of a statute's severability, along with
the related question of when a court should examine a statute's severability, implicates broader
concepts of standing, overbreadth, and the timing of judicial decisionmaking. For general discus-
sions of the relationship between severability, overbreadth, and the timing of judicial review, see,
e.g., PAuL M. BATOR Er AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CouRrs AND THE FEDERAL
SYsTEM 184-96 (3d ed. 1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 14-23
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I. THE CuRiRNT TEST FOR SEVERABILITY AND ITS ORIGINS
Alaska Airlines v. Brock represents the Supreme Court's most recent
attempt to fashion a definitive test for severability. In Alaska Airlines, sev-
eral airlines challenged section 43 of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
which imposed a "duty to hire" certain protected employees who have a
"first right of hire" by any airline hiring employees with their qualifica-
tions. 31 Section 43 authorized the Secretary of Labor to promulgate regula-
tions to implement the program, but section 43 also contained a legislative
veto authorizing either house of Congress to disapprove such regulations. 32
The airlines argued that section 43 should fall in its entirety because the
legislative veto was nonseverable from the other parts of that section.33
A unanimous Court disagreed. The Court first described its general
test for determining severability. It began by stating that "[a] court should
refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary."34 Next the
Court reaffirmed the Champlin test. Under this test, a statute is severable if:
(1) the legislature would have enacted the remaining provisions of the stat-
ute without the invalid provisions, and (2) the remaining provisions of the
statute can function independently of the invalid provision.35 Faced with a
legislative veto, "which by its very nature is separate from the operation of
(1982). The interplay between these concepts is demonstrated in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501-04 (1985); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768-73 (1982); Gannett
Satellite Info. Network Inc. v. Berger, 894 F.2d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1990); Trade Waste Management
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 231-32 (3rd Cir. 1985). A related issue concerns whether a
court considers severability before or after deciding the constitutional question. Severability is
usually examined after a court has held that part of a statute is unconstitutional. See, e.g., New
York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2434 (1992); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. at 802;
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Courts
sometimes examine severability first. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931 n.7 (1983);
Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 633 (1992); McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258, 1261 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978). The latter course is supported by the principle of avoiding consti-
tutional questions whenever possible, see Note, Severability, supra note 6, at 1193 & n.67, except
that deciding severability first does not always eliminate the need to decide the constitutional
question. All of these issues merit separate treatment. I simply note here that a determination of
severability must be necessary to a case or controversy before the issue should be decided.
31. Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 680-81 (1987). Section 43 of the Airline Dereg-
ulation Act is codified at 49 U.S.C. App. § 1552 (1988).
32. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 682.
33. Id. at 685 n.7.
34. Id. at 684 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion)).
Although this language suggests that there is a general presumption of severability, see infra text
accompanying note 88, the Court disavowed any "need to resort to a presumption." Alaska Air-
lines, 480 U.S. at 687. The Court did clarify that the absence of a severability clause does not
raise a presumption of nonseverability. Id. at 686.
35. ld at 684-85 (citing Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234
(1932), overruled by Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 (1950)).
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the substantive provisions of a statute," the Court refined the Champlin test
to inquire "whether the statute will function in a manner consistent with the
intent of Congress. '36 Finally, the Court said that a severability clause cre-
ates a presumption that a statute is severable, but the absence of such a
clause does not create a presumption of nonseverability.37
Applying this test, the Court held the legislative veto severable from
the rest of section 43. The Court examined the relationship of the legisla-
tive veto to the rest of section 43 and concluded that the statutory hiring
duties could stand separately from the regulations authorized by that sec-
tion.38 The Court also reviewed the legislative history of section 43 and
concluded that Congress would have enacted the duty-to-hire provisions
without the legislative veto.39 Based on this analysis, the Court rejected the
airlines' argument and held that the hiring provisions remained in effect
because the legislative veto was severable from those provisions.'
The failure of the Alaska Airlines Court's efforts to create a satisfac-
tory test leaves one to question whether this decision will be the Court's
final word on the subject.41 The present test for severability suffers from
three general shortcomings. First, in asking what the legislature would have
done if it had known that part of a law would be invalidated, the test calls
for an "answer" that is often little more than speculation. Second, the test
downplays the only clear statutory text regarding severability-a severabil-
ity clause-to a presumption of uncertain weight. Finally, the test employs
general presumptions that have developed haphazardly and with little expla-
nation. It is little wonder that severability remains "a vast and troubling
terrain.'
42
36. Id. at 684-85.
37. Id. at 686. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the severability clause in
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the statute amended by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
applied to the case. Id. at 686-87 & n.8.
38. Id. at 687-91.
39. Id. at 691-96.
40. Id. at 697.
41. There is no indication that the changes in the Court since 1987 will affect the test for
severability. Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg are familiar with the issue: Judge Kennedy wrote
the lower court decision affirmed by the Court in Chadha. See Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408,
415-18 (9th Cir. 1980). Judge Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in the lower court in Alaska
Airlines. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Donovan, 766 F.2d 1550, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in the judgment); see also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d
303, 306-08 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam opinion of Ginsburg, Bork & Bazelon, JJ.) (holding that
legislative veto was nonseverable from remainder of provision in appropriations act prohibiting
reorganization by the Department of Housing and Urban Development). Justices Souter and
Thomas have not written any opinions discussing severability.
42. Sidak & Smith, supra note 1 at 456.
1993]
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A. The Champlin Test: Legislative Intent and Function
The Champlin test has its origins in Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's 1854
opinion for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Warren v.
Mayor & Aldermen of Charlestown,43 the first case holding that an uncon-
stitutional statutory provision rendered an entire statute invalid." Prior to
Warren, the severability of statutory provisions was usually assumed. In
the earliest cases questioning the constitutionality of a federal statute, the
United States Supreme Court gave no indication that the unconstitutionality
of one provision-or its application-would render an entire statute invalid.
In Marbury v. Madison,45 for example, the unconstitutionality of section 13
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not render the entire Act invalid.46 As
Chief Justice Marshall later wrote, "If any part of the act be unconstitu-
tional, the provisions of that part may be disregarded while full effect will
be given to such as are not repugnant to the constitution of the United States
.... ,,7 As a result of this lack of guidance, some courts invalidated stat-
utes "so far as" they were unconstitutional,48 while a few courts suggested
43. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84 (1854).
44. Id at 99-100 ('Before proceeding to consider the objections separately, we are all of
opinion that if this act be unconstitutional at all it is not in any separate and independent enact-
ments, but in the entire scope and purpose of the act.").
45. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
46. Earlier, in Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409, 410 (1792), Chief Justice Jay, Justice
Cushing, and District Judge Duane, sitting as the Circuit Court for the District of New York,
indicated that a provision of a 1793 statute that required circuit courts to review certain settlement
claims was unconstitutional because it assigned nonjudicial duties to the circuit courts. The court
assumed without discussion that another provision of the statute requiring circuit courts to sit for a
terms of five days to receive applications remained in force. One early commentator suggested
that the statute considered in Hayburn's Case should have been held nonseverable. Hayes, supra
note 3, at 121-22.
47. Bank of Hamilton v. Lessee of Dudley, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 526 (1829). Some argued
that "an act may be constitutional in part, and unconstitutional in part" as early as 1803. See Stuart
v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 307 (1803) (argument of counsel). This argument was accepted
soon afterward. See Ogden v. Sanders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 316 (1827) (Trimble, I., dissent-
ing); Milne v. Huber, 17 F. Cas. 403, 404 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 9617).
48. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 201 (1819); United States v. The
William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 618 n.1 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700) (noting that Marbury invalidated
the statute so far as it was unconstitutional). Other early decisions holding only part of a law
invalid include Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. State, 4 Ga. 26, 38 (1848) (holding that state
constitutional provision requiring subject of statute to be stated in title invalidates only that part of
statute outside of title); Armstrong v. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374, 376 (Ind. 1825) (holding that uncon-
stitutional provision providing "mode of ascertaining the value of the improvements [of land] ...
does not affect rights of the occupant" under statute); Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.)
70, 73 (1820) (holding that provision repealing statute remains effective even if replacement pro-
visions are unconstitutional); and Glenn v. Humphreys, 10 F. Cas. 471, 472 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)
(No. 5480) (holding that unconstitutionality of state law authorizing qualified discharge from
debts does not invalidate part of law discharging debtor from imprisonment).
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that severability depended on the ability of the remaining provisions to
function absent the unconstitutional provision.49
Then came Warren. The statute at issue in Warren provided for the
annexation of Charlestown to Boston. The court held that one provision of
the act was unconstitutional because it denied the citizens of Charlestown
any state or federal representatives.50 The court then considered whether
the rest of the act should remain in effect. Chief Justice Shaw agreed with
those courts that had found that a statute could be constitutional in part and
unconstitutional in part.5 But he quickly added:
[T]his must be taken with this limitation, that the parts, so held
respectively constitutional and unconstitutional, must be wholly
independent of each other. But if they are so mutually connected
with and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations
or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all could not be
carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue inde-
pendently, and some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions
which are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fall
with them.52
Applying this test, the state supreme court held the statute nonseverable
because all of its provisions described the consequences of the annexation
and were thus dependent on each other.53
Warren was the first case to consider legislative intent-along with the
ability of the remaining provisions of the statute to function-in deciding
severability. This approach to severability gained immediate acceptance
among state courts and has remained virtually unchallenged to this day.54
49. See Clark v. Ellis, 2 Blackf. 8, 10 (Ind. 1826) (suggesting that an unconstitutional provi-
sion could be stricken and the rest of the statute would remain in effect "if enough remains to be
intelligibly acted upon"); Campbell v. Mississippi Union Bank, 7 Miss. (6 How.) 625, 677 (1842)
(stating that the matter "depend[s] on the connection or dependence of the several provisions," so
that "[i]f part of the act can be carried out, and that part be constitutional, it must stand, and the
portion which is unconstitutional must be rejected"); Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1, 34
(1853) (holding that the provision that is "essential to the law" is not severable, while "an in-
dependent provision, not in its nature and connection essential to the other parts of the statute" is
severable).
50. Warren v. Mayor & Alderman of Charlestown, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 98 (1854).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 99.
53. Id. at 99-100.
54. See Lathrop v. Mills, 19 Cal. 513, 530 (1861); Gordon v. Comes, 47 N.Y. 608, 616-17
(1872); State ex rel. Huston v. Commissioners of Perry County, 5 Ohio St. 497, 506-07 (1856);
Slauson v. City of Racine, 13 Wis. 398, 404 (1861); see also Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray)
329, 339 (1857) (citing Warren and finding statute nonseverable); State v. Sinks, 42 Ohio St. 345,
350-52 (1884) (describing Warren as "the leading case" and citing cases following it). As a result
of this approach, many statutes were held nonseverable. See Campau v. City of Detroit, 14 Mich.
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Thomas Cooley, the preeminent constitutional theorist of his day, also en-
dorsed Shaw's approach, causing more courts to adopt the Warren
approach.55
At that point, the Supreme Court jumped on the bandwagon. In the
1880 case of Allen v. Louisiana, the Court quoted Warren and then asked
"whether the unconstitutional provisions are so connected with the general
scope of the law as to make it impossible, if they are stricken out, to give
effect to what appears to have been the intent of the legislature."56 By
1902, the Court found the general test for severability "well settled."57 The
Court stated the test in its current form in Champlin Refining Company v.
Corporation Commission, 8 where Justice Butler wrote: "Unless it is evi-
dent that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are
within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be
dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law."59
276, 285 (1866) (finding that an unconstitutional provision authorizing a six-member jury was not
severable from provision requiring summoning of 24 people for jury duty); State ex rel. Huston, 5
Ohio St. at 506-07 (holding that statutory provision penalizing a county for the placement of its
county seat was unconstitutional and could not be severed from the remainder of the statute);
Slauson, 13 Wis. at 403-05 (holding that an unconstitutional provision authorizing differential
taxation of agricultural lands not severable from remainder of annexation statute).
55. THOMAS M. COOLEY, TRaAnsE ON THE CONsTrWTIoNAL LminwnrAoNs WrncH Rnsr
UPON Ta LEGISLATIVE PowER oF TH STATES OF THE AMmcAN UNION 177-81 (1868). Later
editions of Cooley's treatise expanded on the analysis in the first edition and collected additional
cases. See CooEY, supra note 3. The decisions that relied on Cooley include Moir v. The Du-
buque, 17 F. Cas. 569, 572-73 (E.D. Mich. 1871) (No. 9696); Doe, ex dem. Davis v. Minge, 56
Ala. 121, 124-25 (1876); People ex reL Tucker v. Rucker, 5 Colo. 455, 465-66 (1880); Hinze v.
People, 92 Ill. 406, 424-25 (1879); People ex rel. Miller v. Cooper, 83 1l. 585, 595 (1876); People
ex reL City of Rochester v. Briggs, 50 N.Y. 553, 566-67 (1872); Ex Pane Towles, 48 Tex. 413,
442 (1877); Eckhart v. State, 5 W. Va. 515, 518-19 (1872).
56. 103 U.S. 80, 84 (1881). The Court had begun to articulate rules regarding severability in
two decisions holding that the unconstitutional applications of a statute could not be severed from
the constitutional applications. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 98 (1879); United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876). In Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 89 (1877), the Court held
an overbroad statute severable. Although there is no evidence that the Supreme Court gave any
independent thought to the matter, the suggestion of one writer that the Supreme Court was "con-
tent to follow the lead of a few enterprising state courts that had already emphasized the impor-
tance of legislative intent," Note, Severability, supra note 6, at 1184 n.12 (emphasis added),
understates the widespread acceptance of that approach by the time the Supreme Court adopted it.
57. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 565 (1902).
58. 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932), overruled by Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Okla., 340 U.S. 190
(1950).
59. Id. This test has been quoted in all of the most recent Supreme Court severability deci-
sions. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2434 (1992); Alaska Airlines Inc. v.
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984) (plurality opin-
ion); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976). Most state courts examine the same factors.
See, e.g., State Compensation Fund v. Symington, 848 P.2d 273, 280 (Ariz. 1993); Thayer v. S.C.
Tax Comm'n, 413 S.E.2d 810, 814-15 (S.C. 1992). So, too, do Canadian courts. See In re Blaney
and Ontario Hockey Ass'n, 26 D.L.R.4th 728, 747 (1986) (quoting In re Alberta Bill of Rights
Act, 4 D.L.R. 1, 11 (1947)).
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Under Champlin, a statute's severability depends upon two factors:
(1) legislative intent, and (2) the ability of the statute to function without the
offending provision. Both factors must be satisfied before a court will sever
the unconstitutional provision and give effect to the remainder of the stat-
ute.60  The first inquiry asks whether "it is evident that the Legislature
would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power."'6 ' A
court is thus required to predict what the legislature would have done if it
had known that part of the law it passed would be invalidated. For exam-
ple, if the Ontario legislature would not have enacted the general prohibi-
tion on sex discrimination without the exception for amateur sports, then
the two sections at issue in Ontario Hockey Association would not have
been severable. To assist in this determination, many courts question the
importance of the invalidated provision to the legislature's decision to enact
the statute. 62
The other prong of the Champlin test adds an objective question to the
hypothetical inquiry about whether the legislature would have enacted the
statute without the invalidated provision. It provides that "the invalid part
may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law." While the term
60. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 483 ('The problem is twofold: the legislature must have
intended that the act be separable, and the act must be capable of separation in fact."); see also
Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1256 (Cal. 1989) (stating that an invalid provi-
sion must be grammatically, functionally, and volitionally severable).
61. Champlin Ref., 286 U.S. at 234; accord Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685 ("IT]he uncon-
stitutional provision must be severed unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that
Congress would not have enacted."); National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551,
557 (2d Cir.) ("The critical issue is whether the legislation would have been enacted if it had not
included the unconstitutional provisions."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 852 (1990); House Chadha
Hearings, supra note 6, at 157 (asking "would Congress have thrown out the baby with the
bathwater?") (testimony of Alan Morrison).
62. Chief Justice Shaw asked if the provisions were "conditions, considerations, or compen-
sations for each other." Warren v. Mayor and Alderman of Charlestown, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84,
99 (1854). This language continues to be used today. See Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118,
1128 (6th Cir. 1991). There are several other ways of asking this question. Specifically, an unim-
portant provision is severable, e.g., Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685 (stating that the legislative
veto is not important to the original legislative bargain); an important provision is not severable,
e.g. City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900,907 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding unconstitu-
tional a legislative veto of crucial importance in statute governing presidential impoundments).
Also, a provision is not severable if it was an essential part of the legislative compromise, see
Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1086 (1977) (Skelton, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1009 (1978); or an inducement to passage of the act, see Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Morris
County Bd. of Taxation, 184 A.2d 75, 81 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1962), aff'd, 197 A.2d 176
(N.J. 1964).
The question of whether the legislature intended to enact this law is clearly inappropriate,
because the answer is always "no"; the legislature enacted the law with the provision now held
unconstitutional, not without it. See Alaska Airlines, 766 F.2d at 1560; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke,
734 F.2d 797, 804 (Temp. Emer. Ct App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984). "The moment any
statute is declared invalid it is impossible to carry out the legislative intent in full.. . ." Hayes,
supra note 3, at 141.
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"fully operative" "has received scant attention,"63 the usual understanding
of this part of the test is that it focuses on the dependence or independence
of the unconstitutional provision and the rest of the statute." If the provi-
sions of the statute that would remain once the invalidated provision is ex-
cised can function in a coherent fashion, then the statute is severable.
But the ability of a statute to function without an invalidated provision
does not always mean that the legislature intended it to do so. For instance,
the remainder of a statute can always function independently of a legislative
veto provision, and Ontario's general prohibition on sex discrimination
could operate without the exception for amateur sports-yet the legislature
may not have anticipated either result. Faced with this problem in Alaska
Airlines, the Court refined the Champlin test to inquire "whether the statute
will function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress."65
Alas, that question is no easier to answer than the two parts of the
Champlin test it incorporates. The first disagreements about severability
occurred soon after Chief Justice Shaw first posed the test in Warren.6 6
Severability also divided the Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service v. Chadha,6 7 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,61 and Buckley
v. Valeo.69 And since Alaska Airlines, the lower federal courts have strug-
gled with the severability of various provisions of the Sentencing Reform
63. Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 1993).
64. Or, as it is sometimes put, the unconstitutional provision will be severed if it is function-
ally independent from the other provisions of the statute, but it will not be severed if it is interde-
pendent with the other provisions of the statute. Compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 106, 109
(1976) (stating that public financing provisions are not dependent on unconstitutional expenditure
limits) and United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585-86 (1968) (finding that capital punishment
provision is independent of rest of Federal Kidnapping Act) with Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 83 (1976) (finding that the requirement that physicians take measures to sustain life
is inextricably tied to duty to preserve life of fetus).
65. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.
66. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 99. In three early cases, courts held statutes nonseverable based on
their evaluation of legislative intent. See People ex rel. Miller v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585, 595 (1876);
State v. Sinks, 42 Ohio St. 345, 350-55 (1884); Slauson v. City of Racine, 13 Wis. 444, 450-51
(1861). The dissent in each case would have held the statute severable because the remaining
provisions could continue to operate. See Cooper, 83 l. at 596 (Sheldon, CJ., dissenting); Sinks,
42 Ohio St. at 363-71 (Johnson, C.J., dissenting); Slauson, 13 Wis. at 463 (Cole, J., concurring).
67. Compare INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,931-35 (1983) (finding the legislative veto sever-
able from the grant of power over deportations) with id. at 1013 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (find-
ing the same provision nonseverable).
68. Compare Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 83 (finding unconstitutional a provision re-
quiring a physician to preserve the life and health of a fetus nonseverable from similar require-
ment relating to children) with id. at 100-01 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding same provisions severable).
69. Compare Buckley, 424 U.S. at 109 (finding the unconstitutional expenditure provisions
severable from contribution provisions) with id. at 255 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (finding same provisions nonseverable).
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Act after they had held that the Sentencing Commission established by the
Act to promulgate sentencing guidelines violated the constitutional separa-
tion of powers. Courts first disputed whether the provisions placing the
Commission in the judicial branch7" and authorizing the removal of Com-
mission members were severable. 71 The courts which decided that the
Sentencing Commission and the Sentencing Guidelines could not be saved
then disagreed about the severability of the Commission's enabling
provision and the Guidelines from the rest of the Act.72  Courts also
struggled with severability questions concerning the supervised release
provision,73 the provision for good time credits,7" and the parole
70. Compare United States v. Brown, 690 F. Supp. 1423, 1428 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (finding the
placement of the commission in the judicial branch not severable), aff'd mem., 869 F.2d 587 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989) and United States v. Horton, 685 F. Supp. 1479, 1485
(D. Minn. 1988) (same), aff'd merr, 902 F.2d 1575 (8th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Russell,
685 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (same), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 880 F.2d 419
(11th Cir. 1989) with United States v. Landers, 690 F. Supp. 615, 622 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (finding
provision placing the commission in the judicial branch severable) and United States v. Brittman,
687 F. Supp. 1329, 1342 (E.D. Ark.) (same), aft'd, 871 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated in part,
872 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 865 (1989).
71. Compare United States v. Lopez-Barron, 685 F. Supp. 725, 729 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (not
severable) with United States v. Myers, 687 F. Supp. 1403, 1417-19 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (severable)
and United States v. Sparks, 687 F. Supp. 1145, 1155-56 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (severable).
72. Compare United States v. Cortes, 697 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (not severa-
ble) and United States v. Kane, 691 F. Supp. 341,347 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (not severable) and United
States v. Swapp, 695 F. Supp 1140, 1150 (D. Utah. 1988) (en bane) (not severable), rev'd, United
States v. Singer, 868 F.2d 1201 (10th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Allen, 685 F. Supp. 827,
830-31 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (not severable with one exception) and United States v. Ortega Lopez,
684 F. Supp. 1506, 1515 n.11 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (en bane) (nonseverable) and United States v.
Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463, 1472 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (nonseverable) with United States v. Serpa, 688
F. Supp. 1398, 1401-02 (D. Neb. 1988) (en banc) (severable), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 873 F.2d
1447 (8th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Williams, 691 F. Supp. 36, 53-54 (M.D. Tenn. 1988)
(severable), afrd mem., United States v. Hayes, 884 F.2d 1393 (6th Cir. 1989) and United States
v. Molina, 688 F. Supp. 819, 825 (D. Conn. 1988) (severable) and United States v. Velez-Naranjo,
691 F. Supp. 584, 588 (D. Conn. 1988) (severable) and United States v. Diaz, 685 F. Supp. 1213,
1219-20 (S.D. Ala. 1988) (severable), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, United States v. Zubiaga, 876
F.2d 900 (11th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Perez, 685 F. Supp. 990, 1003-04 (W.D. Tex.
1988) (severable), affd mem., United States v. Carrales, 888 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1989) and United
States v. Estrada, 680 F. Supp. 1312, 1336 (D. Minn. 1988) (severable), rev'd mem., 873 F.2d
1449 (8th Cir. 1989).
73. See United States v. Jackson, 857 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding provision
nonseverable from the rest of the Act).
74. Compare Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding
the provision nonseverable from Sentencing Guidelines), vacated, United States v. Cha-
vez-Sanchez, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989) with id at 1283-84 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (severable) and
United States v. Bogle, 693 F. Supp. 1102, 1110-12 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (en banc) (severable).
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provisions.75 Mercifully, the Supreme Court pretermitted the question by
holding the Act constitutional in Mistretta v. United States.76
B. Presumptions
Perhaps because of the difficulty in applying the Champlin test, other
aids to deciding severability developed-specifically, presumptions and
severability clauses. The jurisprudence about presumptions of severability
is especially confused because the Court has offered little explanation of
why certain presumptions are warranted, how they operate, or how they
relate to each other.
1. General Presumption of Severability
The Court has vacillated over whether there is a general presumption
that statutes are presumed severable, a general presumption that statutes are
presumed nonseverable, or no general presumption about severability at all.
As discussed above, prior to Warren severability was simply assumed.77
The burden of establishing severability became confused after Chief Justice
Shaw's decision in Warren. Some state courts required the proponent of
severability to make the necessary showing; other state courts placed the
burden on the proponent of nonseverability. 78 The Supreme Court never
announced any presumptions concerning the severability of statutory provi-
sions at that time, but dicta in some of its opinions supported a presumption
of nonseverability.79 The large number of Supreme Court decisions holding
statutes nonseverable during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and
75. See United States v. Bogle, 693 F. Supp. at 1110-11 (holding that parole provision is not
severable from Guidelines).
76. 488 U.S. 361, 411-12 (1989).
77. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
78. Compare Lathrop v. Mills, 19 Cal. 515, 530 (1861) (stating that severability is "a matter
of legislative intent," and that the legislature is presumed to intend severability of statutory provi-
sions) with Iowa Life Ins. Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 45 A. 762, 764 (N.J. 1900) (finding that the
burden is on the proponent of severability to show clear probability that legislature would be
satisfied with what is left) and Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 339 (1857) (holding a
statute nonseverable because "the one [provision] may have been the motive, inducement, or
consideration on which the other was founded") (emphasis added) and State ex rel Cornell v.
Poynter, 81 N.W. 431,435 (Neb. 1899) (stating that statute is nonsevemble "if the void part to any
extent influenced the legislature in passing the statute") and State ex rel. Huston v. Commission-
ers, 5 Ohio St. 497, 506-07 (1856) (stating as a "general rule" that statutory provisions are not
severable "unless the respective parts are independent of each other").
79. See El Paso & Northeastern Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 97 (1909) (stating that if "the
matter is in such doubt that we are unable to say what Congress would have done omitting the
unconstitutional feature, then the statute must fall"); Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463,
501 (1908) (stating that severability is appropriate "only where it is plain that Congress would
have enacted the legislation with the unconstitutional provisions eliminated"); see also Skagit
County v. Stiles, 39 P. 116, 116 (Wash. 1894) (finding a general presumption of nonsevembility).
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the first decades of the twentieth century gave further credence to that
view.8 0
The preference for severability versus nonseverability became more
confused in the 1930s. Writing in 1931 while on the New York Court of
Appeals, Chief Judge Cardozo asserted that "[tihe whole tendency during
recent years, at least on this court, has been to apply the principle of sever-
ance with increasing liberality."" l At the same time, however, the Supreme
Court propounded a "shifting presumptions" idea: statutes are generally
presumed nonseverable, but they are presumed severable if they contain a
severability clause.8 2 There was little basis for this newly found general
presumption of nonseverability absent a severability clause. 3 Moreover,
the Court announced the Champlin decision during this period, and it made
no mention of shifting presumptions depending on the presence or absence
of a severability clause. 4 The Court never actually relied on this presump-
tion of nonseverability, but it was cited for years until Alaska Airlines fi-
Professor Cooley also suggested that statutes were presumed nonseverable. See Cooi-Y, supra
note 3, at 248 n.1.
80. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 366 (1915); Butts v. Merchants & Miners
Transp. Co., 230 U.S. 126, 135 (1913); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381-82 (1910);
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. at 501; Illinois Cent. R.R. v. MeKendree, 203 U.S. 514, 529
(1906); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 140-42 (1903); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184
U.S. 540, 564-65 (1902); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 688 (1887); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 636-36 (1895); Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1886);
Poindexter v. Greenhow (Virginia Coupon Cases), 114 U.S. 270, 304 (1884). For tables of nine-
teenth and early twentieth century cases in which the Supreme Court held all or part of a federal
statute unconstitutional and the Court's conclusion regarding severability, see Hayes, supra note
2, at 124-25 n.8; Stem, supra note 3, at 107-08 nn.138-40.
81. People v. Mancuso, 175 N.E. 177, 180 (N.Y. 1931); see also Roberts v. Atlantic Oil
Producing Co., 295 F. 16, 18 (6th Cir.) (stating that severance is preferred, though adding words
of limitation is not), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 582 (1924).
82. See Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 434 (1938); Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312-13 (1936); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 362
(1935), overruled by Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); Utah Power &
Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 184-85 (1932); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 242
(1929).
83. Robert Stem immediately noted the lack of precedent for the Court's new presumption of
nonseverability. Stem, supra note 3, at 118-20 & n.192. The Court relied on a single state court
decision (albeit an opinion written by Judge Pitney, who later served on the Supreme Court) as
evidence of a general presumption of nonseverability. Riccio v. Mayor of Hoboken, 55 A. 1109,
1113 (NJ. 1903) (cited in Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 241 (1928)). Riccio itself
cited Iowa Life Ins. Co. v. Eastern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 45 A. 762 (1900), which announced a
presumption of nonseverability after quoting at length from Cooley's treatise. Id. at 764.
84. 286 U.S. 210 (1932), overruled by Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190
(1950).
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nally put it to rest.85 Several state courts continue to follow the rule that
statutes are presumed nonseverable in the absence of a severability clause. 86
Recent years have witnessed a trend toward finding statutes severable.
The Supreme Court has not invalidated an entire federal law as nonsever-
able since the 1930s.87 Moreover, a plurality of four members of the Court
recognized a general presumption of severability in Regan v. Time, Inc.,88
which has since been relied upon by several lower courts.89 Several state
courts apply such a presumption.9" But a majority of the Supreme Court
85. In Alaska Airlines, the Court wrote that "[i]n the absence of a severability clause...
Congress' silence is just that-silence-and does not raise a presumption against severability."
480 U.S. 676, 686 (1987). But courts had cited the presumption of nonseverability first articulated
in the 1930s before Alaska Airlines, see, e.g., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy
Council, 463 U.S. 1216, 1217 n.1 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); INS v. Chadha, 634 F.2d 408,
415 & 417 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and they continued to do so afterward,
see National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 852 (1990); Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 76 (1st Cir.
1990) (en banc), vacated, Sullivan v. Massachusetts, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991); see also Gubien-
sio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1267 (1988) ("Although the absence of such a clause does
not raise a presumption of nonseverability, it does suggest that Congress intended to have the
various components of the sentencing reform package operate together or not at all." (citation
omitted)), vacated, United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989); United States v.
Allen, 685 F. Supp. 827, 830 (1988) (stating that the absence of a severability clause in Sentenc-
ing Reform Act may be significant because there is a severability clause in another title of the
Crime Control Act).
86. See, e.g., State v. Aldrich, 231 N.W.2d 890, 895 (Iowa 1975); South Carolina Tax
Comm'n v. United Oil Marketers, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 402, 405 (S.C. 1991).
87. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312-17 (1936). The Supreme Court's 1992
decision in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 803-04 (1992), held a state law nonsevemble
for the first time since Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 83 (1976), was decided.
Recent lower federal court holdings of nonseverability include Board of Natural Resources v.
Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 947-49 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that parts of § 620c of the Forest Resources
Conservation and Shortage Relief Act that violate the Tenth Amendment are nonseverable from
the other parts of that section); In re Reyes, 910 F.2d 611, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding execu-
tive order regarding Grenada nonseverable); Ragsdale v. Tumock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1375 (7th Cir.
1988) (finding Illinois abortion law nonseverable), appeal dismissed, 493 U.S. 987 (1989); City of
New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 905-09 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding legislative veto in
federal impoundment act nonseverable); West Virginia Pride, Inc. v. Wood County, 811 F. Supp.
1142, 1150-51 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (finding county obscenity ordinance nonsevemble).
88. 468 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1984). Justice Brennan cited a different principle in dissent:
"[L]ike the general rule of construing statutes to avoid constitutional questions from which it
derives, the doctrine of severability 'does not.., license a court to usurp the policymaking and
legislative functions of duly elected representatives'." Id. at 664-65 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citing Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 (1984)).
89. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1278
(D.C. Cir. 1993); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1394 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d. 800, 802 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Doyle v.
Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 528 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Costleton, 694 F. Supp. 786,
790 (Colo. 1988); United States v. Williams, 691 F. Supp. 36, 53-54 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
90. See, e.g., Muller v. Curran, 889 F.2d 54, 57 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying Maryland law),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990); Payne v. Fairfield Hills Hosp., 578 A.2d 1025, 1030 (Conn.
1990); State v. Monastero, 424 N.W.2d 837, 851 (Neb.), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 936 (1988).
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has not acknowledged a general presumption of severability, despite oppor-
tunities to endorse the Regan plurality's view in Alaska Airlines and other
recent cases.
2. Presumption of Severability Created by the Ability of the Remaining
Provisions of the Statute to Function
Statutes are also presumed severable if they can function indepen-
dently of the unconstitutional provision. As the Court explained the
Champlin test in Chadha, "[a] provision is further presumed severable if
what remains after severance 'is fully operative as a law."'91 Essentially, if
the remaining provisions can function independent of the stricken provision
(the second part of the Champlin test), then it is presumed that the legisla-
ture intended the statute to be severable (the first part of the Champlin test).
The significance of this presumption is unclear. Alaska Airlines did
not refer to this presumption at all.92 Few courts have described what it
takes to overcome such a presumption. 93 Nor has it been explained what a
presumption created by the ability of the remaining parts of the statute to
function without the invalidated provision adds to the general presumption
of severability. Indeed, perhaps the correct answer is that it adds nothing at
all. If the Court had more plainly announced a general presumption of sev-
erability, then the need to resort to a distinct presumption that independent
statutory provisions are severable would largely disappear because the same
kind of evidence that the legislature actually intended nonseverability
would be necessary to overcome either presumption.
Tennessee has long been an exception. See Vollmer v. City of Memphis, 730 S.W.2d 619, 621
(Tenn. 1987) (finding a general presumption of nonseverability). A recent Arizona Supreme
Court decision suggests that the burden is on the proponent of sevembility in that court as well.
See State Compensation Fund v. Symington, 848 P.2d 273, 280-81 (Ariz. 1993) (en bane) (hold-
ing federal equivalency tax nonseverable from unconstitutional alternative minimum tax because
court could not determine whether the legislature would have enacted the federal equivalency tax
alone).
91. 462 U.S. 919, 934 (1983) (quoting Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S.
210, 234 (1932)). Likewise, one writer characterized the Court in Chadha as seeking "to expand
the use of severability through two presumptions: one based on the presence of a severability
clause and the other on the statute's viability without the severed provision." Note, The Aftermath
of Chadha, supra note 6, at 1215 (footnote omitted).
92. In fact, the airlines argued in Alaska Airlines that "[tihe Chadha 'operability' presump-
tion is applicable only after legislative intent favoring severability is determined." Brief for Peti-
tioner at 22-23, Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987) (No. 85-920).
93. But see City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C.Cir. 1987) (stating
that the presumption can be overcome "by strong evidence indicating that Congress would not
have enacted the statute had it known it could not include the unconstitutional provision"); Ameri-
can Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Reagan, 806 F.2d 1034, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that the
presumption can be overcome "by showing that it is evident from the legislative history that
Congress would not have passed the [statute] without the [unconstitutional] provision"), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1068 (1987).
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3. Presumption of Severability Created by a Severability Clause
Alaska Airlines holds that statutes are further presumed severable if
they contain a severability clause.94 Rather than being dispositive of sever-
ability, a severability clause only creates a presumption of severability.
Thus, a statute that contains a provision stating "if any provision is held
invalid, the remainder of the statute shall remain effective" will not neces-
sarily be held severable.95
It has not always been so. The first severability clauses appeared late
in the nineteenth century, and they became much more common around
1910. These clauses were a reaction to those courts that were aggressively
holding statutes nonseverable.96 The earliest legislative statements that
statutory provisions should be construed as being severable were taken at
face value by the courts.9 7 But courts soon soured on express legislative
statements concerning severability. State courts and commentators refused
to accept the proposition that legislatures had authority to dictate to the
courts the appropriate decision regarding severability.98 In 1922, the
94. 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987). Similarly, many state courts treat a severability clause as
creating a presumption of severability. See, e.g., People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five East
Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 371 (Colo. 1985) (en bane); Ingraham v. Champion Int'l, 793 P.2d
769, 773 (Mont. 1990).
95. For examples of statutes held nonseverable despite the presence of a severability clause,
see infra note 97.
96. The first academic commentary on severability clauses described their arrival in dramatic
terms: "Expressive of the present sweeping demand of the public for unrestricted democracy, this
provision stands as a defiance to the courts and their apparent judicial supremacy." Note, Consti-
tutional Law: Partial Invalidity of Statutes: Power of Legislature to Alter General Rules of Con-
struction, 2 CAL.L. REv. 319, 320 (1914). The trend toward nonseverability in the last decades of
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century is described supra notes 68-69
and accompanying text.
97. See Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576, 594 (1914); Yee Gee v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, 235 F. 757, 768-69 (N.D. Cal. 1916); Standard Home Co. v. Davis, 217 F. 904, 916 (E.D.
Ark. 1914); State ex rel. Clarke v. Carter, 56 So. 974, 977 (Ala. 1911); In re Opinion of Justices,
123 P. 660, 662 (Colo. 1912) (en banc); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Murphy, 120 N.W. 1073, 1078
(Mich. 1909); Saari v. Gleason, 148 N.W. 293, 295-96 (Minn. 1914); United N.J. R.R. & Canal
Co. v. Parker, 69 A. 239, 245 (NJ. 1908); State v. Clausen, 117 P. 1101, 1114 (Wash. 1911);
Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209, 218 (Wis. 1911).
98. The speed with which the change took place is best demonstrated by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court: one year it opined that "it would take a very extreme case of palpable absurdity
or falsity in such a provision to justify any court in declaring such a declaration of legislative
intent ineffective, if indeed a court could make such a declaration at all," Borgnis, 133 N.W. at
218, the next year the court said that a severability clause "may be some indication of legislative
intention; but we regard it as merely declaratory of the rules heretofore laid down by this court on
the same subject." State ex rel. Wausau St. Ry. v. Bancroft, 134 N.W. 330, 340 (vis. 1912); see
also Note, Constitutional Law-Partial Unconstitutionality of Statutes-Effect of Saving Clause
on General Rules of Construction, 25 MicH. L. Ray. 523, 527 (1927) (concluding that courts will
not allow severability clauses to deny judicial power to determine severability). But see Note,
Effect of Separability Clauses in Statutes, 40 HARv. L. REv. 626 (1927) (stating that the criticisms
of severability clauses are unwarranted).
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Supreme Court first limited the reach of a severability clause in Hill v. Wal-
lace, in which the Court held the Futures Trading Act was nonseverable
because the unconstitutional provisions were so interwoven with the other
provisions.99 The Court refused to employ the statute's severability clause
to add words of limitation to the statute to make it constitutional, explaining
that
[S]ection 11 [the severability clause] did not intend the court to
dissect an unconstitutional measure and reframe a valid one out of
it by inserting limitations it does not contain. This is legislative
work beyond the power and function of the court.
[U]ndoubtedly [a saving provision] furnishes assurance to courts
that they may properly sustain separate sections or provisions of a
partly invalid act without hesitation or doubt as to whether they
would have been adopted, even if the legislature had been advised
of the invalidity of part. But it does not give the court power to
amend the act.1°°
Two years later, in dicta that developed into a maxim, Justice Brandeis
stated that a severability clause "provides a rule of construction which may
sometimes aid in determining [legislative] intent. But it is an aid merely;
not an inexorable command."'' Soon afterward, Justice Brandeis referred
to "[t]he limited purpose and narrow effect" of a severability clause.' 02
The "shifting presumptions" announced by the Supreme Court in the
1930s relegated severability clauses to creating a mere presumption of sev-
erability. Under that rubric, a severability clause reversed a general pre-
sumption of nonseverability and replaced it with a presumption of
severability. The presumption of severability that a severability clause cre-
ated could be easily overcome, either "by considerations which make evi-
dent the inseparability of its provisions or the clear probability that the
invalid part being eliminated the legislature would not have been satisfied
with what remains,"10( or if "the legislature would not have been satisfied
99. 259 U.S. 44, 70-71 (1922).
100. Id.
101. Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924) (declining to decide severability of Kansas
statute and instead leaving issue for the state courts); accord Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 255
(1976) (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Combs v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 375
S.W.2d 809, 810 (Ark. 1964); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago, 432 N.E.2d 227,
240-41 (111. 1982); Sanza v. Maryland Bd. of Censors, 226 A.2d 317, 327 (Md. 1967). Apparently
Justice Brandeis was uncomfortable with "inexorable commands." See Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that stare decisis is not an
inexorable command), overruled by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
102. National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508, 534 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (disagreeing with application of severability clause to enlarge scope of tax deduction).
103. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235,242 (1928), overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska,
313 U.S. 236 (1941).
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with the statute unless it had included the invalid part."'" The weakness of
the presumption created by a severability clause is best demonstrated by
three Supreme Court cases, decided within a seven year period, holding
statutes nonseverable despite the presence of a severability clause.'05 Rob-
ert Stem captured the idea perfectly when he wrote: "Separability clauses
are thus now significant only because of their absence. Like articles of
clothing, if they are present little attention is paid to them, but if they are
absent they may be missed."'"
In the decades after the 1930s, the courts gave mixed attention to sev-
erability clauses, sometimes treating them as dispositive, 10 7 sometimes sug-
gesting that they were essentially irrelevant, 0 and sometimes saying that
they create a presumption of severability.' 9 Finally, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed in Chadha that a severability clause creates a presumption of
severability,"10 and it did so again in Alaska Airlines."'
How such a presumption works is still unclear. Some courts consider
a severability clause when examining legislative intent pursuant to the first
part of the Champlin test, but do not consider the clause when examining
the function of the statute pursuant to the second part of the Champlin
test. 12 Other courts examine both parts of the Champlin test regardless of
the presence of a severability clause.'" 3 Moreover, several different views
have been expressed about what it takes to overcome the presumption of
104. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 184-85 (1932).
105. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,312-16 (1936); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton
R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935), overruled by Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1
(1976); Williams, 278 U.S. at 241-44.
106. Stem, supra note 3, at 122.
107. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 130-31 (1970); McElroy v. United States ex rel
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281,283 (1960); Marsh v. Buck, 313 U.S. 406,408 (1941); Watson v. Buck,
313 U.S. 387, 395-96 (1941).
108. The Court's statement in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968), that
"the ultimate determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a
clause" has been repeatedly quoted. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1014 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1394 (D.C. Cir.
1990); EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188, 1190 (5th Cir. 1984); Consumer Energy
Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 442 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
109. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 364 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
result).
110. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932; see also id. at 1013 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("A severability
clause creates a presumption that Congress intended the valid portion of the statute to remain in
force when one part is found to be invalid.").
111. 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987).
112. See, e.g., United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local No. 115 Pension
Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1986).
113. See infra note 156 (citing cases in which courts applied the Champlin test notwithstand-
ing the presence of a severability clause).
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severability that a severability clause creates.1 14 Finally, no court has ex-
plained what the presumption created by a severability clause adds to the
general presumption of severability, or the presumption created by the abil-
ity of the other provisions to function independently." 5 It is certain, how-
ever, that the presumption created by a severability clause is not
conclusive-courts frequently hold statutes nonseverable despite the pres-
ence of a severability clause.
The confusion surrounding presumptions and the absence of a consis-
tent effort to explain how severability fits within broader theories of judicial
review and statutory construction has left all of the various tests used over
the years unanchored by a principled approach. The next two sections ex-
plain why legislative intent is the key to determining severability, and why
the existing test for deciding severability often fails to ascertain that intent.
IV. SEVERABILrrY AND LEGISLATIVE INTMNT
"The lodestar of severability is legislative intent.""' 6 That axiom has
been followed by every court to decide severability since Warren. It has
not, however, gone unchallenged. Justices White and Brennan disagreed
over whether severability is "largely" or "exclusively" a matter of legisla-
tive intent." 7 Professor Laurence Tribe has criticized "heavily intent-based
approaches to severability." 118 Another commentator has criticized the
"routine and often evasive reliance on malleable analyses of legislative in-
114. See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686 (stating that the presumption can be overcome by
"strong evidence that Congress intended otherwise"); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v.
Reagan, 806 F.2d 1034, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that presumption can be overcome "by
showing that it is evident from the legislative history that Congress would not have passed" the
legislation without the invalidated provision), cert. denied, National Treasury Employees Union v.
Reagan, 481 U.S. 1068 (1987); Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 416 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that the
presumption can be overcome by a "demonstrat[ion] that 'it is evident' that Congress 'would not
have enacted"' the permissible provisions without the unconstitutional provisions) (quoting
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210,234 (1932)); Senate Chadha Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 100 (testimony of Stanley Brand) (explaining that the presumption created
by a severability clause "may be overcome by examination of Congressional intent which demon-
strates clearly the opposite, namely that Congress would not have enacted" the law absent the
stricken provision).
115. Cf. Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 528 (2d Cir.) (suggesting that a severability
clause reinforces general presumption of severability), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986).
116. Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1267 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated, United
States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989).
117. Compare Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984) (stating that severability "is
largely a question of legislative inten') (plurality opinion of White, J.) with id. at 664 n.2
("[C]ontrary to Justice White's implication, severability is exclusively a question of legislative
intent.") (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. LAURENcE H. TRmE, AMmcAN CoNs-rrtnoNAL LAw § 4-3, 215 n.8 (2d ed. 1988).
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tent,"119 and warned that "the courts will only confuse analysis if they per-
sist in invoking standard conceptions of legislative intent and statutory
construction."120 This Article maintains that severability is properly con-
sidered a question of statutory construction, and that concerns about the role
of legislative intent in deciding severability are better directed toward the
means of ascertaining that intent.
A. The Relationship Between Severability and Legislative Intent
Deciding severability without looking to legislative intent presents
several dangers. Striking down an entire statute as nonseverable when the
legislature intended otherwise expands judicial power. The invalidation of
statutory provisions that the legislature wanted to enact, that are within the
legislature's power to enact, and that the legislature could unquestionably
enact standing alone correspondingly decreases the power of the legislature.
On the other hand, if a court construes a statute as severable contrary to the
legislature's intent, the statutory provisions that remain in effect are akin to
a new statute of the court's design, not the legislature's."' In addition,
holding a statute severable despite a contrary legislative intent can separate
the quid from the quo. For example, Chadha and other legislative veto
cases provoked an outcry because severing legislative vetoes from many
statutes preserved the delegation of power to the President while simultane-
ously eliminating the statutory condition on the exercise of that power.
Lawmakers complained that they would not have delegated that power
without an accompanying legislative veto, but many courts were convinced
otherwise.1 22
119. Note, Severability, supra note 6, at 1183.
120. Id. at 1195.
121. This is not to say that a "new statute" results every time that severance occurs. As
discussed infra at notes 126-30 and accompanying text, the description of the provisions surviving
severance as a "new statute" mischaracterizes what a court actually does when it holds a statutory
provision unconstitutional but severable. The "new statute" criticism is justified only if the statu-
tory provisions surviving severance remain in effect despite the legislature's intent that those
provisions not stand alone. In other words, a "new statute" is one that exists despite the legisla-
ture's intent that the statute as enacted be nonseverable.
122. Besides Alaska Airlines and Chadha, legislative vetoes were held severable in United
States v. Romero-Femandez, No. 91-3720, 1993 LEXIS 1898 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 1993) (Interna-
tional Economic Powers Act); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Reagan, 806 F.2d 1034,
1039-41 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Pay Act); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dyke, 734 F.2d 797, 802-05 (temp. emer.
ct. app. 1984) (Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act and Energy Policy and Conservation Act),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984); EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188, 1190-92 (5th
Cir. 1984) (Reorganization Act); Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425,440-45 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (National Gas Policy Act); see also 15 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 61 (1991) (preliminary
print) (Selective Service Act of 1948). By contrast, legislative vetoes were held nonseverable in
City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 905-09 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (section 1013 of the
Anti-Deficiency Act); EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 743 F.2d 969, 971-74 (2d Cir. 1984) (Reorganization
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Whenever a court misconstrues legislative intent regarding severabil-
ity, the legislature is forced to revisit the matter to reinstate its original plan.
This comes with an institutional cost; Congress does not easily amend stat-
utes after they have been construed by the Supreme Court.'23 The abandon-
ment of legislative intent as the criteria for severability decisions would
necessitate further legislative action if courts refused to make any attempt to
discern whether the legislature wanted the remaining statutory provisions to
stand.
Despite these dangers, there are two arguments against reliance on leg-
islative intent in deciding severability. The first argument presumes that
every statute must be treated as an inviolable whole. This is an argument
against the principle of severability itself, and not just how severability is
determined because it would require that all statutes be held nonseverable.
The argument draws some support from the President's apparent lack of
inherent power to line item veto specific provisions of a statute.' 24 If a
"bill" within the meaning Article I of the Constitution is the entire bill con-
sidered by Congress and presented to the President, then perhaps a court has
no more power than the President to separate different parts of the enact-
ment. But the argument that statutory provisions are never severable be-
cause each statute is a complete, indivisible whole proves too much. It fails
to explain overbreadth and other doctrines limiting judicial challenges to
the specific provision under attack, all of which assume that the unconstitu-
tionality of one part or one application of a statute does not automatically
result in the invalidation of the whole statute. Nor is it consistent with the
actions of recent presidents who have employed a severability analysis
Act); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 306-08 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(HUD Appropriation Act); McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258, 1261 (4th Cir. 1977) (Fed-
eral Salary Act).
123. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpreta-
tion Decisions, 101 YALE LJ. 331, 334 (1991) (presenting "a revised view of the legislative
process and the interaction between the Court, Congress and the Presidenf). State legislatures
face another problem if they are not scheduled to meet for a significant period after a court has
ruled. See Stern, supra note 3, at 115.
124. See, e.g., 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 159 (1988) (preliminary print) (advising that the
president does not have inherent line-item veto power). But see Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at
439-41 (suggesting that the president has inherent line-item veto power); 137 CONG. Rac.
H3029-04 (daily ed. May 14, 1991) (statement of Rep. Campbell) (same). Of course, the argu-
ment can be turned around. See Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 456 ("If the excision of unconsti-
tutional provisions is sometimes inherent in the judicial power, it is not immediately obvious why
it is not equally inherent in the executive power."). The analogy does not work, however, in states
that provide line-item veto power to the executive. In fact, many state courts have struggled with
severability issues raised by a state governor's line-item veto of part of a bill. See generally 138
CONG. REc. S2287-01, S2290-92 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Byrd) (describing
history of severability issues raised by state line-item vetoes).
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when announcing which parts of a bill they would enforce, notwithstanding
their belief that they lacked the power to line-item veto a bill.125
Professor Laurence Tribe makes a related argument. He suggests that
the provisions of a statute may not be separated because the result would be
a statute that has not been enacted in conformity with the Constitution's
bicameralism and presentment requirements.126 Under the Constitution, the
exclusive process by which a law may be enacted includes approval by both
houses of Congress and presentment to the President.127 The key to this
argument is the assumption that a statute from which a court has severed an
unconstitutional provision is a new statute, an assumption the Court has
shared on occasion. 128
But this argument ignores the fact that the statute did become effective
after enactment by both the House and the Senate and approval by the Pres-
ident. Why, then, must the enactment procedure be repeated after a provi-
sion of a statute is found to be unconstitutional? It need not be repeated,
and Tribe himself explains why." 9 A court deciding a constitutional attack
on a statute gives effect to all of the law before it-both the statute itself
and the Constitution. When part of the statute and the Constitution conflict,
the Constitution trumps the contrary statutory provision. That does not
mean, however, that the unconstitutional statutory provision is physically
removed, i.e., "severed," from the statute. Rather, the statute still exists as
125. E.g., Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 1630, 16 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1824 (Nov. 19, 1990) (stating that provisions establishing a Chemical Safety Investi-
gation Board violate the appointments clause but are severable), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3887-1; Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 3611, 25 WEEKLY COMp. PRES.
Doc. 1947 (Dec. 13, 1989) (explaining that the provision conditioning authority to provide foreign
assistance on approval by a single House of Congress is unconstitutional under Chadha but sever-
able), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1436-1.
126. Tribe, supra note 6, at 21-23. Tribe views it as ironic that Chadha, the very decision
holding that legislative vetoes violate the bicameralism and presentment clauses, did not consider
the relevance of those same clauses in holding that the legislative veto was severable from the
remainder of the statute. Id. Nonetheless, the conclusion he eventually reaches is similar to the
conclusion reached in this Article. He writes:
Invalidation of the entire law would result only if one could show that the meaning of
the entire law Congress enacted was so thoroughly and radically compromised by the
invalidation of the law's veto device that, as a matter of ordinary statutory construction,
the stump that remains after the veto branch has been cut off ought to be given no legal
effect at all.
Id at 25. This statement seems to imply that severability should be favored, and it endorses the
use of general principles of statutory construction in deciding severability, see infra notes 142-49
and accompanying text.
127. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
128. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1985) (referring to the statute
created in the absence of the unconstitutional provision).
129. Tribe first floated this explanation in 1985, see Tribe, supra note 6, at 25-26, and re-
peated it in the most recent edition of his treatise. See TRmFE, supra note 118, at 215 n.8.
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it was enacted, although the unconstitutional provision will never be given
effect. Accordingly, the statute that is given effect in subsequent cases is
the same statute enacted by Congress and presented to the President, except
that the unconstitutional provision is never applied. The bicameralism and
presentment problems disappear absent the misleading metaphor of
"severance." 130
B. Which Legislative Intent?
Simply saying that severability is a matter of legislative intent is inade-
quate. That general assertion could lead to at least four different inquiries,
including an examination of: (1) the meaning of the statute itself (a textual-
ist approach); (2) the purpose of the statute (a purposive approach); (3) the
legislature's intent when it enacted the statute (an intentionalist approach);
or (4) what the legislature would have done had it considered the issue (an
imaginative reconstruction approach). 13 1 All severability tests since War-
ren have examined the last question.
The Champlin test asks whether "it is evident that the Legislature
would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, inde-
pendently of that which is not."'132 It is thus representative of the "imagina-
tive reconstruction" theory of statutory construction advocated by Judge
Posner, and before him by Judge Learned Hand.' 33 Judge Posner analo-
130. Legislation that is contingent on future events presents an analogous situation. See, e.g.,
Paulsen, supra note 21 (describing contingent nature of state applications for a constitutional
convention). Severability and nonseverability clauses operate in much the same way. See
Caminker, supra note 29, at 1208 n.87 (suggesting that severability clauses could be viewed as
"contingency legislation"). But see Sidak & Smith, supra note 1, at 462-63 (suggesting due pro-
cess problems with contingent legislation).
131. For a general discussion of each theory, see WnLuLas N. EskRDGE, JR. & PHILIP P.
FRicKEY, CASES & MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POL-
icy 569-639 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 324-45 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Stat-
utory Interpretation]. For arguments in support of completely different models, see T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MicH. L. REv. 20 passim (1988); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 -ARv. L. REv. 407 passim (1989).
132. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932), overruled by
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 (1950).
133. Judge Posner describes his theory in RICHARD A. PosNRi, THE FEDERAL Couirs: CRisIS
AN REFoRM 286-93 (1985) [hereinafter PostER, THE FEmRAL CouRts]; and Richard A. Posner,
Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CAsE
W. RE S. L. REv. 179 (1986) [hereinafter Posner, Legal Formalism]. For examples of Judge
Hand's approach to statutory construction, see Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Co., 154
F.2d 785, 789-93 (2d Cir.), aftd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946); Borella v. Borden Co., 145 F.2d 63, 64-65
(2d Cir. 1944), aft'd, 325 U.S. 679 (1945). Recent cases following this approach are listed in
EsKRIDGE & FEicEY, supra note 131, at 608. For general criticisms of the theory, see Eskridge
& Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 131, at 329-32.
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gizes statutory construction to the giving of orders within the military. 134
Just as an inferior military officer must follow the orders of a superior of-
ficer, so too a judge must follow the "orders" of the legislature as embodied
in a statute. When the orders are "garbled," Judge Posner posits that a
judge, like an inferior military officer, should ask "what would the framers
have wanted us to do in this case of failed communication?"13 Champlin
asks the same question.
There is some intuitive appeal to a severability test sustaining statutory
provisions that the legislature would have enacted anyway and invalidating
those provisions the legislature would not have enacted independently. But
the question posed by Champlin is purely speculative, as many frustrated
courts have acknowledged.' 36 The hypothetical question about what the
legislature would have done yields a certain answer only if the legislature
anticipated that severability may be an issue and included a provision ad-
dressing that contingency in the statute. In that case, however, the orders
from the legislature to the court were not garbled at all. By contrast, decid-
ing severability without a severability clause is analogous to an inferior
officer proceeding with no orders whatsoever. If there is no provision in
the statute addressing severability, the inquiry into what the legislature
would have intended can probably never be answered with certainty. 37
134. Posner, Legal Formalism, supra note 133, at 189-90.
135. Id.
136. See Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523, 527 (2d Cir.) ("We can do no more than
make an educated guess ...."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986); Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d
476, 482 (5th Cir. 1981) (declining to sever a provision "on the authority of a wholly speculative,
and insupportable, interpretation of legislative intent"); Roberts v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co., 295
F. 16, 17-18 (6th Cir.) ('The difficulty is in determining what the Legislature would have done, if
it had not done what it did do."), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 582 (1924); State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d
761, 766 (Del. 1972) ("All we have to go on, in pursuit of ethereal legislative intent regarding
severability, is the chronological history of the two statutes and speculation."); Indiana Educ.
Employment Relations Bd. v. Benton Community Sch. Corp., 365 N.E.2d 752, 760 (Ind. 1977)
('To say that [the legislature] would have passed the Act without the invalid portions, had it
known of their invalidity, would be to indulge in sheer speculation."). Other observers have
voiced the same complaint. See House Chadha Hearings, supra note 6, at 221 (testimony of
Harold Bruff) ("Because the severability issue calls for a hypothetical inquiry about legislative
intent, it is, as the Supreme Court admitted in Chadha, 'elusive.' "); id. at 157 (testimony of Alan
Morrison) (characterizing what legislature would have done as "necessarily a hypothetical ques-
tion"); 1 WESTE. W. WI.LOUGHBY, THE CONsrrrtoNAL LAW OF THm UNrrED STATEs 37 (2d ed.
1929) ("Mhe courts speculate freely as to what would probably have been the desires of the
enactors of the law had they known that effect would not be given to those provisions of the law
which the courts find to be unconstitutional."); Smith, supra note 6, at 402 ("[S]everability is a
question of hypothetical legislative intent").
137. Again, the frustration experienced by the courts is palpable. See Penn v. Attorney Gen-
eral, 930 F.2d 838, 845 (11th Cir. 1991) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("[Wihere the legislature has not
indicated its intent through a severability clause, it is almost impossible to determine the contin-
gent intent of the legislature."); Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380, 388 (6th Cir. 1984)
(stating that "severance in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent is a murky en-
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Would the Ontario legislature have generally prohibited sex discrimination
if it could not have limited the reach of that prohibition to girls playing
hockey? Persuasive arguments can be offered for either conclusion based
on the structure, purpose, and history of the Ontario Human Rights Code,
but we will never know the answer for sure.
Public choice theory highlights the difficulty of searching for legisla-
tive intent absent a severability clause. "The basic behavioral postulate of
public choice, as for economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility
maximizer.' ' 138 This perspective reveals the futility in asking what a group
of legislators, each acting in their own self-interest, would have done if they
had known that their preferred outcome would be denied them. The inabil-
ity to determine how each legislator would have voted makes it impossible
to determine what the legislature would have done.
Moreover, Judge Posner aside, the question asked by Champlin does
not represent the usual approach to statutory construction. Textualism and
intentionalism are far more common. Thus, courts have noted the differ-
ence between statutory construction generally and the test for determining
severability. 139 As Professor Tribe has written:
To be sure, legislative history and intent may shed light on this
issue of meaning just as on other issues of statutory construction.
But there is a major, even if subtle, difference, both in principle
and as a practical matter, between (a) treating evidence of what
Congress would have done, or would have wanted courts to do, in
the event of partial invalidation as shaping our understanding of
what Congress's law means; and (b) treating Congress's
deavor"); ABCD, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 391 N.E.2d 1217, 1224 (Mass. 1979)
(considering the absence of a severability clause, court "would be engaging in the sheerest specu-
lation as to the Legislature's intent if we were to assume that the legislature would have adopted"
the statute in a revised form). By contrast, a severability clause "leaves no room for speculation as
to the intention of the . . . legislature with respect to severability." Manufacturers Ass'n of
Tri-County v. Knepper, 801 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987); see
also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) ("[W]e need not speculate as to the intent of the
Alaska Legislature; the legislation expressly provides that invalidation of any portion of the statute
renders the whole invalid."); Oceanographic Comm'n v. O'Brien, 447 P.2d 707, 715 n.2 (Wash.
1968) (Finley, CJ., dissenting) ("As the enactment contains a severability clause, speculation...
is unnecessary.").
138. DENNIS C. MUE.LE, PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1979). For a survey of public choice and related
literature, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tax.
L. Rav. 873 (1987); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. Rv. 167 (1988).
139. For example, Judge Newman has written that severability "is always said to require a
determination of legislative intent, but it is not the traditional inquiry as to what the legislatures
intended their broad statutory language to mean when applied to a specific set of facts." Doyle,
786 F.2d at 527 (citations omitted).
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unenacted wishes or inclinations as the very objects of the court's
search. 14o
Tribe added that he views the first perspective "as the only defensible
one. ' 141 This perspective also adheres more closely to the Supreme Court's
general approach to statutory construction. Indeed, this approach offers an
alternative way in which to decide severability that adheres to legislative
intent yet avoids the speculation about what the legislature would have done
if it had only known that part of its work would be invalidated.
In short, Chief Justice Shaw was right: severability is a question of
legislative intent. But Shaw and his successors needlessly confused sever-
ability analysis by insisting on a hypothetical inquiry into what the legisla-
ture would have done. That misstep has been compounded by dismissing
the legislature's clear statements about severability. The test proposed in
this Article eliminates the need to speculate about what the legislature
would have done. It accomplishes this by tracking the approach to statutory
construction used by the Supreme Court when the interpretation of other
statutory provisions is at issue.
V. SEVERABILITY AS STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The severability of a statute should be determined according to general
principles of statutory construction. In recent years, the Supreme Court has
usually followed a textualist approach to statutory construction. The Court
begins with the text of the statute. If the meaning of the text is plain, then
the text is controlling. 42 The only exceptions to this rule occur in "the
most extraordinary circumstances."' 43 If the statutory text is ambiguous,
then the Court will consult other "traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion," including the structure of the statute, its purpose, and the legislative
history.'" In addition, the Court has used presumptions and clear statement
rules with increasing frequency as aids in construing a statute.'4 5
140. Tribe, supra note 6, at 26-27 n.118.
141. Id. at 27 n.118.
142. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151, 2157 (1993); Estate of
Cowart v. Nickols Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589, 2594 (1992); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v.
Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n,
111 S. Ct. 1156, 1163 (1991); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41
(1989).
143. Estate of Cowart, 112 S. Ct. at 2594; see also Freytag v. Commissioner of IRS, 111 S.
CL 2631, 2636 (1991) ("rare and exceptional circumstances").
144. INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-49 (1987).
145. See, e.g., Astoria Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2169-70 (1991);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). For a thorough discussion of the
Court's recent use of presumptions and clear statement rules, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmak-
ing, 45 VAN. L. Rnv. 593 passim (1992).
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This Article maintains that this framework should be applied to sever-
ability. This idea is developed in three parts. First, when the legislature
includes a severability clause or a nonseverability clause in a statute, such
an explicit statement should be construed according to its plain meaning.
Second, when the statutory text fails to refer to severability, the structure of
the act, its purpose, and the legislative history should be consulted, even
though such sources are not as helpful in determining severability as they
are in generally construing the meaning of a statute. Finally, the approach
advocates a general rule favoring severability. This could be a presumption
of severability; or, better yet, a judicially created requirement that the legis-
lature's intent concerning the severability of a statute be clearly stated in the
statute; or, best of all, a legislatively enacted clear statement rule providing
that all statutes should be construed as severable absent a specific nonsever-
ability clause.
I recognize, of course, that it could be the Court's approach to statu-
tory construction that is wrong, not its approach to severability. Statutory
construction has received a great deal of attention in the last few years,
much of it critical of the Court's approach. 146 Moreover, the Court has not
been uniform in deciding questions of statutory construction.147 I nonethe-
less submit that the approach to statutory construction usually followed by
the Court would produce a better test for severability than the test set forth
in Alaska Airlines. Moreover, the most frequent objection to a textualist
approach cannot be made in the context of severability. Many of the
Court's recent cases evidence a disagreement about whether the meaning of
146. The literature on this topic is extensive. Recent symposia devoted to statutory construc-
tion include Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L.
REv. 529 (1992); Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 80 GEo.L.J. 457 (1992);
Symposium on Statutory Interpretation, 66 Cm.-KIzNr L. RExv. 321 (1990). For a list of academic
works just between 1988 and 1991, especially Professor Eskridge's voluminous writing, see Earl
M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement,
Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. Rav. 767, 767-68 n.1
(1991). And, of course, see ESKRroGE & FRicKEY, supra note 131, at 569-635.
147. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1153-54 (1991) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) ("In recent years the Court has vacillated between a purely literal approach to
the task of statutory interpretation and an approach that seeks guidance from historical context,
legislative history, and prior cases identifying the purpose that motivated the legislation."); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452 (acknowledging that the Court has sometimes strayed from the
plain meaning rule); see also Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival
of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MNN. L. RFv. 241, 256 (1992) ("The Supreme Court
remains up for grabs. For every case that seems to be a victory for textualism, another can be
found that reflects more conventional intentionalist methodologies, and the purpose approach is
not dead, either." (footnotes omitted)). But the Court's fluctuations should not be exaggerated. I
agree with those commentators who have detected a decided preference for a textualist approach
in the Court's most recent statutory construction decisions. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 passim (1990); Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems
of Plain Meaning: A Response to Alienikoff and Shaw, 45 VAmro. L. Ray. 715, 716 (1992).
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the statutory language is plain.'4 8 By contrast, if the statutory text refers to
severability, there is rarely a dispute about the meaning of the text itself.'49
With this understanding, this Article spells out how the Court's approach to
statutory construction can be used to decide severability.
A. The Plain Meaning of Severability Clauses
The gulf between the Court's approach to statutory construction and
the Court's test for determining severability is widest with respect to the
treatment of severability clauses. In most statutory construction cases, the
Court begins with the plain meaning of the statutory text. The only circum-
stances in which the Court will depart from the plain meaning of a statutory
provision are where the plain meaning produces an absurd result,15 0 or in
some instances, where the plain meaning produces a result "demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its drafters"'' or a result that would defeat the
purpose of the statute.' 52 By contrast, in severability cases the statutory text
(a severability clause) is usually treated as merely establishing a presump-
148. The examples include Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. CL 2151, 2157 (1993)
(statute ambiguous); id. at 2167 (Souter, J., dissenting) (statute unambiguous); and West Virginia
Univ. Hosps., Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1146-48 (statute unambiguous); id- at 1149 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (statute ambiguous). As Eskridge and Frickey observe, "the 'plain meaning' of the statute is
not a reliable way to determine its meaning in hard cases. Almost all scholars of legislation agree
that the meaning of a statute in cases where the language does not provide a completely determi-
nate answer ought to be found by looking at the larger 'context' of the statute." EsKRmO &
FmicKEY, supra note 131, at 571 (emphasis added).
149. Take this example: "If any provision of this statute is held unconstitutional, all other
provisions shall remain in effect." Considered in a case where one provision of a statute contains
a constitutional defect that is not shared by any other provision of the statute, the plain meaning of
the severability clause is obvious.
150. "An interpretation that would produce an absurd result is to be avoided because it is
unreasonable to believe that a legislature intended such a result." John P. Stevens, The Shake-
speare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1372, 1383 (1992) (citing Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). The Court is divided, though, about
how unusual a reading must be before other materials may be consulted. Compare Public Citizen
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453-54 n.9 (1989) (holding that reading need not
be absurd) with id. at 473 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that reading must be
absurd).
151. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S. Ct. 599, 604 (1991) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Con-
tractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)); see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1169
(1993) (insisting that statutory text is controlling unless there is a "'clearly expressed legislative
intent to the contrary' (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)).
152. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983); Lewis v. Grinker, 965
F.2d 1206, 1215, 1221-24 (2d Cir. 1992).
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tion of severability. 53 Sometimes a severability clause does not even fare
that well. 154
The justifications for not reading a severability clause according to its
plain meaning are unconvincing. Generally, three reasons are offered: (1)
the statutory provisions remaining after severance would be unworkable
standing by themselves, (2) the court perceives a severability clause as an
illegitimate legislative threat to its judicial power, or (3) the court does not
believe that a severability clause means what it says. Although the first
reason is consistent with a recognized exception to the plain meaning rule
in some cases, the second reason is misguided, and the third is simply
wrong.
First, courts ignore a severability clause when the resulting "statute"
cannot operate.155 The plain meaning rule does not prohibit a court from
invalidating an entire statute if the remaining provisions produce an absurd
result. But a lower standard for departing from the statutory text is pres-
ently employed in deciding severability. Under the present severability test,
a statute containing a severability clause will nonetheless be held nonsever-
able if it fails the Champlin test, i.e., if the court believes that the legislature
153. To be sure, in some statutory construction cases the statutory text is described as creating
a presumption concerning the meaning of the statute. See Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain,
112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) ("We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there."); Ardestani v.
INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 520 (1991) (referring to "[tlhe 'strong presumption' that the plain language
of the statute expresses congressional intenf'); INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427 (1987)
(referring to "the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it
chooses"); see also Schauer, supra note 147, at 721-23 (describing plain meaning rule, like other
formalist arguments, as presumptive rather than conclusive). This "presumption" is much differ-
ent from the presumption of severability afforded a severability clause. In Connecticut Nat'l
Bank, for instance, the "presumption" created by the statutory text was conclusive, for the Court
added that "[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous... 'judicial inquiry is complete.'
112 S. Ct. at 1149 (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (citations omitted)).
154. See Caminker, supra note 29, at 1208 n.87 (noting that severability clauses are usually
viewed as nonbinding instructions like preambles and enactment clauses); William D. Popkin, The
Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 543, 604 n.266 (1988) (stat-
ing that "the judicial disregard of the plain meaning of a severability clause" is an "example of
treating statutory language as dictum").
155. Robert Stem's example was Mazurek v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 181 A. 570 (Pa.
1935), in which "the only valid provision of a statute (apart from the separability clause itself) was
the section repealing the earlier law which the unconstitutional provision,, were to replace." Stem,
supra note 3, at 124. For cases in which the courts held statutes nonseverable despite a severabil-
ity clause because the remaining provisions of the statute were so interconnected with the uncon-
stitutional provision as to preclude their separate operation, see National Advertising Co. v. Town
of Niagara, 942 F.2d 145, 148-51 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing anomalies that would result if munic-
ipal sign ordinance severable); Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110, 1117-18
(N.D. Ga. 1990) (holding statute nonseverable because only definition and costs sections remained
after provision requiring drug testing invalidated); Long Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride, Inc. v. City
of Long Beach, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 868 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1993) (finding insurance and depart-
mental service charge provisions dependent on unconstitutional parade permit requirement).
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would not have enacted the statute without the invalidated provision or if
the remaining provision would not function in a manner consistent with
legislative intent absent the invalidated provision. This is the same test that
applies if there is no severability clause. 156 By contrast, the plain meaning
rule would treat a severability clause as dispositive of severability in all but
those instances in which severance would produce an absurd result.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.' illustrates this difference. Carter in-
volved a constitutional challenge to the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
of 1935, which imposed a heightened excise tax on coal producers that
failed to submit to the Act's price fixing and labor provisions.15 8 The Court
held that the labor provisions, which sought to regulate wages, hours, and
working conditions, were unconstitutional. 159 Although the Act had a sev-
erability clause, the Court held that the labor provisions were nonseverable
from the price-fixing provisions because "[t]he interdependence of wages
and prices is manifest."'160 This result is wrong under the higher standard of
the absurd results test. Notwithstanding the connection between wages and
prices, the severability clause plainly said that the provisions could stand
alone, and it is in no way absurd to enforce price fixing controls
independently.' 6 '
156. After all, a severability clause was present in Champlin itself. Champlin Ref. Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210,234-35 (1932). Sometimes the courts explicitly state that the
same test applies. See Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Nordberg, 630 F.2d 855, 863
(1st Cir. 1980); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1085 (Fed. Cir.) (Skelton, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). There are also some decisions suggesting that the Champlin
test need not be applied if there is a severability clause. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932
(1983) ("[V]e need not embark on that elusive inquiry since Congress itself has provided the
answer to the questions of severability."); National Treasury Employees Union v. United States,
788 F. Supp. 4, 12 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that Champlin test applies only in absence of severabil-
ity clause). Alaska Airlines is ambiguous on this point: after stating the Champlin test, the Court
said that "[tihe inquiry is eased when Congress has explicitly provided for severance by including
a severability clause in the statute." Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987) (empha-
sis added).
157. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
158. Id. at 281.
159. Id. at 297-312.
160. Id. at 315.
161. ld at 312. As Justice Cardozo wrote:
Undoubtedly the rules as to labor relations are important provisions of the statute. Un-
doubtedly the lawmakers were anxious that provisions so important should have the
force of law. But they announced with all the directness possible for words that they
would keep what they could have if they could not have the whole.
Id. at 336 (Cardozo, J., dissenting); see also id. at 317-24 (Hughes, CJ., separate opinion) ("The
purpose of Congress, plainly expressed, was that if a part of that aid [provided by the Act] were
lost, the whole should not be lost.").
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Second, courts resist severability clauses because they perceive such
provisions as a legislative usurpation of judicial power.162 Of course, if
reading a severability clause according to its plain meaning would usurp
judicial power, then severability clauses themselves are unconstitutional, a
result only one court has reached.' 63 If severability is a matter of statutory
construction, then it is appropriate-indeed, preferable-for the legislature
to address severability in the text of a statute. The legislature often directs
the courts how to construe statutes. 164
Two other related arguments rest on the claim that a severability clause
intrudes on the role of the courts. One argument contends that a severabil-
ity clause is evidence of legislative intent (the first part of the Champlin
test) but not of the ability of the remaining statute to function absent the
invalidated provision (the second part of the Champlin test).' 65 Some sev-
162. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text. Professor Singer is especially adamant
that "the authority of a court to eliminate invalid elements of an act and yet sustain the valid
elements is not derived from the legislature, but rather flows from powers inherent in the judici-
ary," and thus severability clauses should be given a limited reading. SuTHERLAND, supra note 3,
at 507-08.
163. Mathews v. Schweiker, No. 79-G-5251-NE (N.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 1982) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file), rev'd, Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984). In Mathews, a retired postal
worker claimed that he was unconstitutionally denied spousal benefits that a similarly situated
woman would have been eligible to receive. The challenged statute contained a severability
clause which provided that the benefits would be denied to everyone if the gender classification
was invalidated. The district court concluded that the classification violated the Equal Protection
Clause. The court then held that the severability clause itself was unconstitutional as "an uncon-
stitutional usurpation of judicial power by the legislative branch.... By enacting a severability
clause to accompany the unconstitutional requirement of the pension offset exception, Congress
attempted to mandate the outcome of any challenge to the validity of the exception by making
such a challenge fruitless." Id. at *10. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach the issue
of the constitutionality of the severability clause because the Court concluded that the plaintiff
would have had standing to challenge the classification in any event. 465 U.S. at 739-40. For
discussions of the severability issue in Mathews, see Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United
States, 987 F.2d 1174, 1178-79 n.3 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane); id. at 1184-85 (Goldberg, J., dissent-
ing); Kurtz v. Baker, 829 F.2d 1133, 1151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
164. Congress has specified general rules of statutory construction in 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). See
Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 113 S. Ct. 716,719 (1993)
(construing definition of "person" in 1 U.S.C. § 1). For a recommendation that Congress enact
more instructions concerning statutory construction, see Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone,
Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 561, 566-72
(1992). Remember, too, that severability clauses first developed in response to concerns about
judicial manipulation of severability doctrine. See Note, Severability, supra note 6, at 1184-85.
165. See State ex rel. Crumpton v. Montgomery, 59 So. 294, 303 (Ala. 1912); Talley v. Suc-
cession of James Merkel Stuckey, 614 So.2d 55, 59 La. 1993) (stating that severability clause
demonstrates "the intention that all valid provisions be retained in full effect.., and hence creates
a presumption of severability in fact"); see also Stern, supra note 2, at 118 (stating that the
Supreme Court's early case law viewed severability clauses as "conclusive as to the legislative
intention").
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
erability clauses say exactly that,166 and they should be read according to
their terms. Most severability clauses, however, contain no such limitation.
It is improper to imply such a limitation on the effect of a severability
clause because the ability of a statute to continue to function absent an
unconstitutional provision is itself really a question of legislative intent. 67
Rather, a severability clause's instruction of severability should be disre-
garded only if it would produce an absurd result.
The third argument of this type contends that a severability clause may
not be used to rewrite a statute. "Courts generally do not add words of
limitation to statutes because they are aware of the dangers of intruding on
the legislative function." '168 Thus, if a statute is invalid in certain applica-
tions, courts are properly leery of sua sponte adding any language to the
statute that would prohibit such applications. If a severability clause specif-
ically provides that the invalid applications are severable, however, then the
fear of usurping the legislative function is misplaced because the statutory
text itself authorizes the action. National Treasury Employees Union v.
United States169 provides a good illustration of this issue. The court held
that a provision in the Ethics in Government Act 7 0 prohibiting federal em-
ployees from receiving honoraria was unconstitutional as applied to em-
ployees of the executive branch. 171 Judge Williams, joined by Judge
Randolph, held that the unconstitutional application of the statutory ban to
executive branch employees could be severed from the permissible applica-
166. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ArNN. § 32-804 (1992) ("The invalidity of any part of this chapter
shall not be construed to affect the validity of any other part capable of having practical operation
and effect without the invalid part."); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 31.21 (1992) ("If any part of
this Act is decided to be unconstitutional and void, such decision shall not affect the validity of the
remaining parts of this Act unless the part held void is indispensable to the operation of the
remaining parts.").
167. As Robert Stem explained:
In theory, a legislative body has power to enact laws or parts of laws which are incapa-
ble of being given legal effect. Accordingly, if a legislative body should for some or no
reason desire that an ineffectual or meaningless part of a law stand alone, the legislative
intention should prevail. But the fact that valid provisions of a statute are incapable of
having legal effect by themselves is ordinarily conclusive proof that the legislature did
not intend them to stand by themselves.
Stem, supra note 3, at 76 n.1.
168. Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 1125 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Regan v. Time,
Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 644-45 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating
that severability clause is not a license to usurp policy and legislative functions); Hill v. Wallace,
259 U.S. 44, 70 (1922) (holding that severability clause is not a license to amend an act); Ameri-
can Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 333 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[E]ven the broadest
severability clause does not permit a federal court to rewrite as opposed to excise."), aft'd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
169. 990 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
170. See 5 U.S.C.A. App. 7, § 501(b) (as amended) (1993).
171. National Treasury Employees Union, 990 F.2d at 1273.
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tions of the statute to legislative and judicial branch employees. 172 Judge
Sentelle argued in dissent that severance was improper because federal
courts cannot add language to a statute.173 The statute did not have a sever-
ability clause, so Judge Sentelle's point is well taken. On the other hand, if
the statute contained a severability clause providing that unconstitutional
applications were severable, then Judge Williams would have been correct.
The final, most common, and most troubling reason given for ignoring
the plain meaning of a severability clause is that the clause itself is mean-
ingless. Courts and commentators often dismiss severability clauses as
"boilerplate" that the legislature unthinkingly inserts into a statute without
considering whether it really wants each provision of its handiwork to stand
independently.174 Consider the remarkable decision of Nixon v. Allen, 75 in
which the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a statute was nonseverable
notwithstanding the presence of a severability clause. Section 28 of the
statute, the severability clause, provided: '"The Legislature hereby declares
that it would have passed the remainder of said act, and each and every part
thereof, irrespective of such unconstitutional part."' 7 6 The court declared,
"We do not believe that the Legislature intended by the language of the
twenty-eighth section to declare that it would have passed each and every
part of the act even though several of its outstanding provisions were un-
constitutional and stricken out."'1 7 7 Nixon v. Allen is an extreme case, but it
172. lId at 1279-81.
173. Id. at 1296-98 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
174. Professor Tribe, for example, refers to "a boiler-plate severability clause (of the sort most
laws contain)." Tribe, supra note 6, at 22; see also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 463
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to "a legitimate severability clause, or some other
equally innocuous provision"); Lindenberg v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 90 F.R.D. 255, 258
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (describing severability clause as "merely boilerplate"); Sums AND, supra note
2, at 507 ("Because of the very frequency with which it is used, the separability clause is regarded
as little more than a mere formality"); McNiven, supra note 22, at 1295 (suggesting that "the
severability clause is so commonplace in federal legislation that it did not capture the attention of
the courts and the Agency"); John F. Bodie & E. A. Steffen, Jr., Note, Delegation and Separabil-
ity Aspects of the Housing and Rent Act of 1949, 25 NoTRE DAmB L. REv. 79, 96 (1949)
("[I]ndiscriminate use of the separability clause has weakened its evidentiary effect."). Early
warnings that the frequent inclusion of severability clauses in legislation would dilute their effec-
tiveness were prophetic. See Note, Effect of Separability Clauses in Statutes, supra note 98, at
629 ("lIt is to be feared that, as the clauses become more common and assume the appearance of
mere formality, less and less weight will be given to them.").
175. 234 S.W. 45, 50 (Ark. 1921).
176. Id. at 47.
177. Id. at 48. The court thus struck down an entire act establishing a county government
because of an unconstitutional provision creating two county judges. The court claimed that the
unconstitutional provision was "to this act as is the hub to a wheel or the foundation pillars to a
building," id at 50, but the court's description of the provisions of the statute indicates that at least
some of the provisions were not completely dependent on the invalid provision, id. at 45-47. The
court simply disbelieved the severability clause. Id. at 47 ("[Wle are convinced that, if the Legis-
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does not stand alone in holding that the legislature would not have enacted
the remaining provisions of a statute, no matter what the severability clause
says. 178 Conversely, at least one court has held that the legislature intended
a statute to be severable despite the presence of a nonseverability clause.179
In addition, other courts have held that a statute is nonseverable without
even acknowledging the existence of a severability clause.18 0
Although there is some truth to the charge that severability clauses
often receive little attention in legislative drafting, 8' or that legislatures
enacting such clauses know that the courts have not read such clauses for
what they say,18 2 the "boilerplate" claim fails in two respects. First, the
claim that a severability clause is entitled to less force then other statutory
lature had known in advance that several of the more important sections would be eliminated
because of their unconstitutionality, it would not have enacted the remaining portions of the act.").
178. See Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1303 (111. 1990) (finding statute
nonseverable despite severability clause because "the legislature would not have enacted this stat-
ute"); Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 330 A.2d 640, 645 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974)
(holding statute nonseverable despite severability clause because invalid provision must have been
an inducement); Lynden Transp., Inc. v. State, 768 P.2d 475,480 (Wash. 1989) (en bane) (finding
statute nonseverable because "a severability clause will not save other portions of the act if the
court nonetheless decides that the Legislature probably would not have passed the remaining por-
tion of the act without the invalid part or if we believe the remaining valid enactment would not
reasonably accomplish the legislative purpose"); see also Brown v. Alexander, 516 F. Supp. 607,
620-21 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) ("In applying the severability clause, the duty of this Court is to deter-
mine whether the legislature would have passed the act without its obnoxious provisions."), affd
in part, 718 F.2d 1417 (6th Cir. 1983).
179. Stiens v. Fire & Police Pension Ass'n, 684 P.2d 180, 184-85 (Colo. 1984) (en bane)
(holding that the legislature intended the prospective benefit provisions of a state pension act to be
severable from the act's unconstitutional minimum funding provisions, notwithstanding the act's
nonseverability clause).
180. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Tumock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1377 (7th Cir. 1988) (Coffey, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing the majority for "completely disregard[ing] the statute's severability clauses as if
they didn't exist"); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976) (holding statute severable but
not citing severability clause); Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 1128-29 (6th Cir. 1991)
(discussing severability without noting severability clause).
181. Members of the legislature themselves sometimes refer to "usual" or "boilerplate" sever-
ability clauses. See 134 CONG. REc. 12,280 (1988) (statement of Rep. Frank) (describing clause as
"just boilerplate severability"); H.R. REP. No. 988, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1970) (describing
section as "the usual separability provision in legislation"); see also Senate Chadha Hearings,
supra note 6, at 41 (testimony of Michael Davidson, Legal Counsel to the U.S. Senate)
("[Sleverability clauses, which are added, possibly without a great deal of reflection at the end of
statutes, [may] provide a greater license than the Congress truly intended for the judicial branch
to restructure statutes."); id. at 103 (testimony of Stanley M. Brand, General Counsel to the House
Clerk) (testifying that severability clauses "were in the files of the legislative counsel like boiler-
plate in wills"); id. at 123 (testimony of Louis Fisher, Congressional Research Service) (describ-
ing "severability clauses as boilerplate language in public laws").
182. The legislature is presumed to be familiar with judicial rules of construction. See, e.g.,
Department of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (1992); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra
note 9, at 555 n.96 (citing cases on congressional acquiescence in executive constructions of a
statute).
SEVERABILITY
provisions is exaggerated. Second, the claim does not justify reading the
statutory language in a manner contrary to its plain meaning.
That severability clauses are common does not necessarily indicate
that they are meaningless. It more likely evidences that the legislature usu-
ally wants provisions of its acts to be severable. This explanation is consis-
tent with the presumption that a legislature generally intends its acts to be
severable. Moreover, the fact that a particular kind of provision is common
in statutes does not mean that it is meaningless.
Severability clauses are not always added to a statute unthinkingly.
Legislatures have debated the desirability of including a severability clause,
and in doing so, they have evidenced a keen awareness of the consequences
of severability vel non. For example, during the Senate debate over a child
care bill in 1989, Senator Helms introduced an amendment to remove the
bill's severability clause and to attach a nonseverability clause instead.183
He did so because if a provision authorizing parents to use federally-funded
child care certificates for religious day care was invalidated, he wanted the
entire title to fall so Congress could "go back to the drawing board."
1 84
Senator Hatch responded that a severability clause was necessary "so that
all of the legislation is not wiped out in a single swoop of the Supreme
Court's pen." 185 Other opponents of a nonseverability clause characterized
it as "a back-door attempt to kill the bill."186 Undeterred, Senator Domenici
claimed that the nonseverability clause was necessary because "the whole
bill would fail but for the religious section."' 87 The amendment failed (as
did the entire bill, eventually), but the debate itself revealed a congressional
awareness of the choice between severability and nonseverability.
188
183. 135 CONG. R c. S7439-42 (daily ed. June 23, 1989).
184. Id. at S7440.
185. Id. at S7441. Other senators noted that severability clauses were a common mechanism
for preventing entire statutes from being invalidated. See id. at S7441 (statement of Sen. Dodd);
iU. (statement of Sen. Mitchell); id. at S7442 (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
186. Id. at S7442 (statement of Sen. Ford); see also id. (statement of Sen. Durenberger) ("tilts
actual intent is to bury a legal landmine in the bill before us, which he hopes will eventually
destroy it.").
187. Id. at S7441.
188. The recent debate over campaign financing legislation offers another example. The bill
reported by the Senate Rules Committee would have made its key provisions nonseverable. See S.
REP. No. 41, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1993) (stating that § 101(c) of S.3 provides for nonsever-
ability of certain provisions); it at 66 (stating that § 903 provides that other provisions are severa-
ble). Several senators objected to the nonseverability provision. See 139 CONG. REc. S7140
(daily ed. June 10, 1993) (amendment introduced by Sen. Chafee to replace the nonseverability
clause with a severability clause). Indeed, severability was one of the key principles insisted upon
by a group of senators seeking to break the gridlock on the bill. See 139 CONG. REc. S6442 (daily
ed. May 25, 1993) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("[S]everability should be part of this bill"); 139
CoNG. REc. S6433 (daily ed. May 25, 1993) (statement of Sen. Cohen) (stating that the fifth point
is severability and that "[clertainly we can supply no argument against that").
1993]
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The testimony in the congressional hearings in the aftermath of
Chadha further rebuts the argument that severability clauses are enacted
unwittingly by the legislature. Many were hostile to severability clauses
(which is not surprising because Congress was hostile to the holding of
severability in Chadha generally), but that testimony reveals that Congress
is aware that it has the ability to choose whether to include severability
clauses, and that its choice is likely to have an effect. Representative
Moakley stated that the inclusion of severability clauses "has not been an
intelligent policy," and that such provisions "are a dangerously open invita-
tion to the courts to assume th[e] legislative function" of deciding whether
to reexamine the legislation.'" 9 He thus suggested a prohibition or limita-
tion on the use of severability clauses and a requirement to consider non-
severability clauses. 190 The House counsel testified that he "always
believed.., that severability clauses were against our interest, and consist-
ently advised committees not to insert them," and therefore, he recom-
mended that "severability clauses ought to be banned by legislative fiat" if
Congress does not want to delegate power unconditionally to the Presi-
dent. 191 Others, including the Senate counsel, also expressed concerns about
severability clauses.' 92 Such complaints belie the suggestion that severabil-
ity clauses-at least severability clauses enacted since Chadha-were en-
acted by the legislature unawares.
In addition, severability clauses are not automatically included in all
legislation, or even all constitutionally problematic legislation. Congress
did not include a severability clause in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985,19 the subject of the Supreme Court's
most recent severability decision involving a federal statute, 194 even though
Congress knew that part of the Act raised a constitutional question. 195 Nor
did Congress include a severability clause in the Sentencing Reform Act. 196
The omission of a severability clause in such statutes shows that the legisla-
ture does not always include severability clauses as a matter of course, even
when it knows that an act will be subject to constitutional attack. 197
189. House Chadha Hearings, supra note 6, at 275.
190. Id. at 276.
191. Id. at 41 (testimony of Stanley M. Brand, General Counsel to the House Clerk).
192. Id. (testimony of Michael Davidson); id. at 123 (testimony of Norman Ornstein, Visiting
Scholar, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research); id. (testimony of Louis Fisher,
Congressional Research Service).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b - 2021j (1988).
194. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2434 (1992).
195. See 131 CoNG. Rnc. S18252 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Simpson).
196. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
197. The Guam abortion law, Guam Pub. L. 20-134 (1990), see Guam Soc. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1992), and the Ethics in Government Act
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The diversity of severability clauses further illustrates that they are not
simply boilerplate. The general term "severability clause" encompasses a
variety of provisions. Severability clauses include both specific provisions
in a particular statute detailing which provisions of that statute are severa-
ble' and "general severability clauses" stating that all statutes are severa-
ble.199  They provide that severability must always occur" or that
severability occurs only in certain circumstances.2"' They speak in terms of
legislative intent20 2 or provide directions about which provisions or applica-
tions may survive a finding that another provision is unconstitutional. In-
of 1989, Ethics in Gov't Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.A. App. 7 § 501 (1993), see National Treasury
Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993), are other recent, controversial
statutes that did not include a severability clause.
198. See, e.g., Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 778 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting Illinois statute
providing for severability of "any provision, word, phrase or clause of this Act or the application
thereof to any person or circumstances").
199. Many states have general severability clauses that establish a general rule for the sever-
ability of all statutes. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.030 (1992) (stating that all statutes shall be
construed as if they contained a specific severability clause); COLO. REv. STAT. § 2-4-204 (1973)
(stating that statutes are severable unless valid provisions are so dependent upon void provision
that legislature would not have enacted alone "or valid provisions ... are incomplete and incapa-
ble of being executed"); 1 NJ. STAT. ANN. 1:1-10 (1992) (stating that invalidation of part of a
statute shall not invalidate other parts of the statute). In some cases, both a general provision and
a statute-specific provision apply. See, e.g., Muller v. Curran, 889 F.2d 54, 57 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990); Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1545 (7th Cir. 1985),
aft'd, 484 U.S. 171 (1987). There is no federal general severability clause.
200. See Chadha v. INS, 462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983) ("If any particular provision of this Act, or
the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and
the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby."
(emphasis omitted)).
201. See Shea v. North Butte Mining Co., 179 P. 499, 504 (Mont. 1919) (involving severabil-
ity clause providing for severance only if the main purpose of the act can be effected without the
invalid provision).
202. For provisions stating that the legislature intends the statute to be severable, see, e.g.,
Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-1490 (1992) ("It is declared that the sections, clauses, sentences and
parts of this article are severable... ."); Brown v. Alexander, 718 F.2d 1417, 1428 (6th Cir. 1983)
(quoting Tennessee statute). For provisions stating that the legislature would have passed the
remaining provisions of the statute without the offending provision, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-838 (1992) ("It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent that this act would have been
enacted had such unconstitutional or invalid provisions not been included.'); WAsH. REv. CODE
§ 66.98.020 (1992) ("[IDt is hereby declared that, had the invalidity of such [provision] been
considered at the time of the enactment of this act, the remainder of the act would nevertheless
have been enacted without such and any and all such invalid [provisions]."); National Found. v.
City of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41, 47 n.3 (5th Cir. 1969) (quoting Fort Worth ordinance), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970); Sage v. Baldwin, 55 F.2d 968, 969 (N.D. Tex. 1932); Yee Gee v.
City & County of San Francisco, 235 F. 757, 768-69 (D.C. Cal. 1916) (quoting San Francisco
ordinance); State v. Inland Empire Refineries, Inc., 101 P.2d 975, 981 (Wash.) (en banc) (quoting
Washington statute), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 713 (1940).
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deed, the legislature may include a nonseverability clause directing that
statutory provisions are not severable.2 '3
The variety of severability clauses demonstrates that their actual lan-
guage should not be ignored. When the legislature wants a court to pre-
sume that the provisions of a statute are severable, it says so.2°4 Thus, if the
legislature says that the provisions of a statute are severable, that language
should be respected. Moreover, the precise language of a severability
clause can make a difference. In Wyoming v. Oklahoma,2 "5 an Oklahoma
statute contained a severability clause providing that "[t]he provisions of
this act are severable and if any part or provisions shall be held void, the
decision of the court so holding shall not affect or impair any of the remain-
ing provisions of this act."206 The clause did not provide that unconstitu-
tional applications of the statute were severable. As the Court noted,
"[s]everability clauses may easily be written to provide that if application
of a statute to some classes is found unconstitutional, severance of those
classes permits application to the acceptable classes. 20 7 Thus, once the
Court held that the statutory requirement that Oklahoma utilities use at least
ten percent Oklahoma mined coal violated the Commerce Clause, the Court
held that the application of the statute to state-owned utilities could not be
severed from the application of the statute to other utilities.208 This result
honors the specific language of the severability clause and refuses to accept
the myth that the language adopted by the legislature in a severability
clause is irrelevant.2"9
The alternative sources of legislative intent are unlikely to equal the
clarity of the statutory text itself. Even if there is no record of why the
legislature included a severability clause in a statute, that is not an adequate
203. For examples of nonseverability clauses, see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982);
Biszko v. RIHT Fin. Corp., 758 F.2d 769, 773 (1st Cir. 1985); Scinto v. Kollman, 667 F. Supp.
1106, 1109 (D. Md. 1987); Brookins v. O'Bannon, 550 F. Supp. 30,31 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aft'd, 699
F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1983).
204. See, e.g., OKLA STAT. tit. 75, § Ila (1991) (providing that statutes are to be presumed
severable unless affected provisions are interconnected or incapable of standing alone).
205. 112 S. Ct. 789 (1992).
206. Id. at 803 (quoting Oklahoma statute).
207. Id. (footnote omitted). By contrast, one court in viewed a clause similar to that con-
strued in Wyoming v. Oklahoma as "evidenc[ing] a marked preference for maintaining any por-
tion of the civil service law that remains after partial invalidation." Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786
F.2d 523, 528 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986).
208. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. at 802-04.
209. The attention that courts pay to the precise words of a severability clause is further illus-
trated by the cases emphasizing the "unusually explicit" language of such a clause as justifying a
holding of severability. See Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1023 (1st Cir.
1981). As a response to the dilution of the effect of severability clauses as their numbers in-
creased, Robert Stem advocated specific severability clauses indicating precisely which statutory
provisions are severable from other statutory provisions. See Stem, supra note 3, at 122-26.
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basis for concluding that the legislature meant something less than it said.
An equally plausible inference from the absence of any legislative history
regarding a severability clause is that the provision was so noncontroversial
that no debate was necessary. In any event, as Professor Daniel Farber has
written, "this suspicion [that Congress did not really mean what it said,]
although perhaps well-founded, should not carry much weight in statutory
interpretation."21
The "boilerplate" argument, then, is unpersuasive. Yet that in itself
does not justify a change in the test for severability. If construing a sever-
ability clause according to its plain meaning is unnecessary and possibly
harmful,21' why should the rule be changed now?
This question invites three responses. First, the current severability
rule is internally inconsistent. It preaches the primacy of legislative intent,
but rejects the normal means of ascertaining legislative intent. For exam-
ple, a legislature may truly intend to make all parts of a statute severable
and thus enact a severability clause, but a court may still hold the statutory
provisions nonseverable. To avoid such a result and to effectuate its intent,
the legislature would have to say: 'This statute is severable-and we really
mean it."
Second, the current severability rule produces unpredictable results.
Even among those courts agreeing that a severability clause creates a pre-
sumption of severability, there is no agreement about what it takes to over-
come that presumption. Finally, not surprisingly, legislators display
conflicting understandings of what a severability clause means.212 Applica-
210. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J. 281,
300 n.94 (1989). Thus, even though Justice Scalia-the Court's foremost advocate of the plain
meaning rule-has referred to some statutory language as "boilerplate," he did so not because the
language should be ignored, but because the language was not sufficiently clear to overcome an
applicable contrary presumption. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2918
(1993).
211. See Stem, supra note 3, at 123. Stem would have found severability clauses controlling
in cases of severable application but not in cases of severable language. Id. at 100-01; cf. Es-
kridge, supra note 147, at 683 (changing rules regarding the significance of legislative history
would frustrate Congress' understanding when it passed laws).
212. Although some members of Congress recognize that the Court usually presumes that
statutes are severable, see 133 CONG. R.c. 28,595 (1987) (statement of Rep. Shaw); others believe
that a severability clause is necessary to overcome a general presumption of nonseverability, see
123 CONG. REc. 9,352 (1977) (statement of Rep. Drinan). At least one member of Congress is not
familiar with severability at all. See 139 CONG. Rac. S7357 (daily ed. June 16, 1993) (statement
of Sen. Wellstone) (asking if part of the bill "is ruled unconstitutional, then what happens to the
rest of the legislation? Then what do we have by way of any legislation? What happens then?").
The confusion is not necessarily the fault of Congress. One severability clause was added to a bill
precisely because of the unpredictability of the courts. See 134 CoNG. REc. H3645 (daily ed. May
25, 1988) (statement of Rep. Frank).
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tion of the plain meaning rule to a severability clause would place the deter-
mination of severability within a familiar interpretive framework.213
Furthermore, the current severability rule attributes to the legislature
the intent to enact a superfluous provision. The legislature has no reason to
include a severability clause if statutes are already presumed severable. De-
cisions treating a severability clause as merely codifying the general sever-
ability rule further treat the statute's provisions as irrelevant.214
Severability clauses, therefore, should be read according to their plain
meaning."' In addition to the general advantages of bright-line rules for
both the courts and the legislature, treating a severability clause as disposi-
tive of severability avoids the need to speculate about what the legislature
would have done if it had known that part of its work would be invalidated.
When there is no severability clause, that prediction becomes unavoidable.
B. Statutory Construction Absent a Severability Clause
If the plain meaning of a statute is unclear, i.e., if the statute does not
contain a severability clause, then severability should be determined in the
same manner that ambiguous statutes are construed. When the statutory
text is unclear, the courts look at the statute's structure, purpose, and legis-
lative history to determine what the statute means. These sources can shed
some light on whether a statute was meant to be severable, but too often
they are also inconclusive.
213. See Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003,2010 (1989) ("What is of paramount impor-
tance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it
may know the effect of the language it adopts."). The trickiest question is whether evidence in the
legislative history that the legislature enacted the severability clause believing that it only created
a presumption precludes application of the rule advocated here. This situation reflects a broader
disagreement about how to construe a statute when the plain meaning and the legislative history
conflict. This Article sides with the proponents of adhering to the plain meaning. Legislators'
statements concerning severability are suspect for the same reason that legislators' statements with
respect to statutory meaning are generally suspect-there is no assurance that they reflect the
understanding of the entire legislature (or even a majority).
214. See, e.g., Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n, Inc. v. Gudis, 573 A.2d 1325, 1333-35 (Md. 1990).
215. A final issue concerns the timing of a change in the rule. For example, in State v. Al-
drich, 231 N.W.2d 870, 895 (Iowa 1975), the court observed that a statute enacted in 1851 pre-
ceded the existing rule that the absence of severability clause creates a presumption of
nonseverability. If a court has previously construed a severability clause in a particular statute,
stare decisis counsels against overruling the construction of that statute. See Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 164 (1989) (stare decisis in statutory construction establishes a very
strong presumption of correctness). Compare Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The
Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 177, 210 (1989) (arguing
that the Court should never overrule statutory precedents) with Earl Maltz, The Nature of Prece-
dent, 66 N.C. L. Rnv. 367, 388-91 (1988) (criticizing strict stare decisis rule). A decision an-
nouncing that severability clauses should be construed according to their plain meaning but
applying that new rule prospectively offers one way to avoid this problem. See Note, The After-
math of Chadha, supra note 6, at 1220 (describing the use of prospective overrulings).
SEVERABILITY
Apart from a severability clause, examination of a statute's structure is
the most promising source of insight into legislative intent concerning sev-
erability. In fact, under the second part of the Champlin test, courts already
consider the structure of a statute when determining whether to invalidate
the entire statute. Indeed, absent the textual indication of severability pro-
vided by a severability clause, the second part of the Champlin test offers a
proper inquiry into legislative intent concerning severability. Moreover, the
inability of the surviving statutory provisions to function without the invali-
dated provision is strong evidence of nonseverability, even if that inability
to function does not rise to the level of an "absurd result" that would be
necessary to overcome the contrary language of a severability clause.
This focus on structure attempts to ensure that a statute is construed in
a way that harmonizes all of its provisions.216 Often a statute's design pro-
vides evidence that the statute can operate if one provision is eliminated, or
alternately, that the statute cannot operate if another provision is eliminated.
In addition, it has long been recognized that certain types of statutory provi-
sions are generally severable or nonseverable. Riders to appropriations
bills, amendments to existing legislation, and penalties attached to underly-
ing offenses are all generally viewed as severable.217 By contrast, sever-
ability is less favored in criminal statutes because of the need for special
clarity when criminal penalties may ensue.218
Yet the structure of a statute may not tell the whole story. To use the
most common example, a grant of power to the executive branch can func-
tion independently of a legislative veto provision, but other evidence may
show that severance would be inconsistent with legislative intent. Further-
more, some types of statutory provisions are susceptible to conflicting argu-
ments regarding severability. Exceptions to general statutory commands
are a good example. On the one hand, exception clauses are often held
216. As Justice Stevens admonishes, "Read the entire statute." Stevens, supra note 150, at
1376; see also Sunstein, supra note 131, at 425 ("[Ain interpretation should be disfavored if it
would make the disputed provision fit awkwardly with another provision or produce internal re-
dundancy or confusion.").
217. For examples of subsequent amendments held severable, see United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570,588 n.33 (1968) (severing a capital punishment provision which was a later addition
to the Federal Kidnapping Act); Gentry v. United States, 546 F.2d 343, 347 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (sever-
ing requirement that child must live with parent to receive benefits under Civil Service Retirement
Act). But see SutrrRLAND, supra note 3, at 535. For examples of invalid penalty provisions held
severable, see New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2434 (1992); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 395-96 (1894).
218. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n Inc. v. Webb, 654 F. Supp. 503, 505 (N.D. Ga.
1987) (involving unconstitutional exception for libraries from obscenity law that caused whole act
to fall because presumption created by general severability clause was rebutted by rule that inva-
lidity of exception to a criminal statute causes the whole statute to be invalid); SurHLND,
supra note 3, at 435.
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severable because the other provisions can stand alone by definition.2 19 It
is equally plausible, though, that the exception is evidence that the legisla-
ture was not satisfied with an unqualified general command. Ontario
Hockey Association illustrates this problem: did the legislature want the
general bar against sex discrimination to stand without the exception for
amateur hockey teams, or did it not?220 The structure of that statute raises,
rather than answers, the question of severability.
The purpose of a statute is another factor employed in determining the
221statute's meaning. Courts have held statutes severable if the purpose
would be achieved by the remaining statutory provisions and nonseverable
if the purpose could not be achieved.222 But reliance on a statute's purpose
is not always so simple. There is the difficult matter of determining the
"purpose" of a collective body. If, as is likely, the legislature had several
purposes, which ones must be achieved for a statute to be held severable?
Presumably, not all of the purposes can be achieved once part of the statute
becomes ineffective." 3 And which purposes control? One commentator
responding to Chadha opined that a court should ignore a legislative veto in
ascertaining the relevant statutory purpose for deciding severability.224
219. See, e.g., Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389,
1398-99 (8th Cir. 1985); Rhode Island Chapter of the Nat'l Women's Political Caucus, Inc. v.
Rhode Island Lottery Comm'n, 609 F. Supp. 1403, 1419-20 (D.R.I. 1985).
220. Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 501 A.2d 817, 830-32 (Md. 1985), provides the
closest analogy. A Maryland statute generally prohibited discrimination but provided an excep-
tion for single-sex clubs. The court held the exception nonseverable from the rest of the statute.
Id.
221. For a general discussion of the role of purpose in statutory construction, see REaD DICK.
ERSON, THE INTRP=rAnON AND APPLICATrON OF STATUTES 87 (1975); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 passim
(1984).
222. Compare New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2434 (1992) (finding penalty
provision severable because it was only one incentive to achieve the overall purpose of a radioac-
tive waste statute) with Ratcliff v. County of Buncombe, N.C., 663 F. Supp. 1003, 1010-11
(W.D.N.C. 1987) (finding statute nonseverable because it would fall to achieve purpose of estab-
lishing a particular form of government for a county); see also Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 116 Mass.
315, 321 (1874) (finding divorce statute nonseverable because "[t]o hold otherwise would be to
impute to the Legislature the purpose that a man who was still the husband of one wife might be
authorized by this court to marry another").
223. In one case, congressional desire for "comprehensive reform" caused a court to hold the
Sentencing Reform Act nonseverable, see Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1267-68
(9th Cir. 1988), but the same court held that Guam's desire to pass a comprehensive abortion
statute did not demand severability, see Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962
F.2d 1366, 1369-70 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992).
224. Note, Severability, supra note 6 at 1196. Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir.
1991), presents another example. The majority held a Kentucky abortion statute nonseverable
because the dominant purpose of the act was stricken, id. at 1128-29, while the dissent argued that
the legislature's goal of assuring parental consent would be honored by severance. I&. at 1131-32
(De Mascio, J., dissenting).
SEVERABILITY
Thus, reliance on the purpose of a statute in deciding severability is far too
often a speculative exercise.
Similarly, legislative history is often relied upon in determining sever-
ability, but the conclusions drawn from this examination prove no less spec-
ulative. Justice Jackson's quip that "[lt is a poor cause that cannot find
some plausible support in legislative history"225 has been echoed in describ-
ing the relevance of legislative history to severability.226 Perhaps the great-
est difficulty in relying on legislative history when deciding severability is
that such history infrequently discusses severability. Legislative history is
more often cited in severability cases for evidence of the statute's purposes,
from which an inference about severability may be gleaned. Obviously,
such reliance suffers from all of the difficulties presented by depending on
statutory purpose. And even when the legislative history contains a direct
statement about severability, the significance of that statement is questiona-
ble. For example, the federal courts of appeals disagreed about the sever-
ability of a legislative veto from the Reorganization Act, and in particular,
about the proper weight to be afforded Representative Drinan's statement
during the congressional debate that the legislative veto was not severable
from the remainder of the statute.227 Similarly, in United States v. Jackson,
the Supreme Court held that the death penalty provision was severable from
a federal kidnapping statute despite one representative's statement that "the
legislation would not be worth anything without the death penalty
provision. 221
225. Robert H. Jackson, Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 125 (1948). For a
sampling of the recent commentary on legislative history, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992); Abner J. Mikva, A
Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DuKE LJ. 380; Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About
the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE LJ. 371, 375; Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper:
The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States
Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1990); Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult
Legislative History Today, 105 HARv. L. Ray. 1005 (1992). This Article addresses the role of
legislative history when it conflicts with the plain meaning of the statutory text. See supra note
202.
226. See Senate Chadha Hearings, supra note 6, at 123 (testimony of Louis Fisher). In Con-
sumer Energy v. FERC, for example, the court observed that "the legislative history, as almost
always is the case, contains contradictory comments about the importance" of the two relevant
provisions, and the court acknowledged "two remarkably different interpretations of the legisla-
tive history and intent." 673 F.2d 425, 442-44 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd, Process Gas Consumers
Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1250 (1983).
227. Compare EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188, 1190-92 (5th Cir. 1984) (sever-
able) with EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 743 F.2d 969, 971-74 (2d Cir. 1984) (nonseverable). See also
Note, The Aftermath of Chadha, supra note 6, at 1232 (arguing that Representative Drinan's
statement was clear evidence of legislative intent); cf. Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380,
387-88 (6th Cir. 1984) (refusing to reach severability issue).
228. 390 U.S. 570, 587 n.31 (1968) (quoting statement of Rep. Dyer). As Judge Skelton
wrote: "That such comments [supporting an invalidated provision] appear in the record is hardly
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In short, a statute's structure, purpose, and history may offer some evi-
dence of legislative intent regarding severability, but none of these sources
can be expected to provide a definitive answer. Because severability is
such a straightforward question, when the legislature has a specific inten-
tion, it expresses it via a severability or nonseverability clause. Yet many
statutes lack such provisions. Accordingly, something more is needed-a
default rule that can guide both courts and legislatures in deciding sever-
ability when there is little evidence of legislative intent.
C. A Rule Favoring Severability
A general severability rule must be theoretically and empirically justi-
fied, clearly understood and consistently applied, and operate in a straight-
forward manner. In short, it must be different from the presumptions that
courts have used in deciding severability because the use of contradictory
presumptions, their inconsistent application, and uncertainty about the force
of any presumption has robbed them of any real force. The best rule, as I
explain here, is a clear statutory statement favoring severability.
1. Basis for a Rule Favoring Severability
There are two reasons for adopting a rule favoring severability, one
theoretical and one empirical. The theoretical justification derives from
several familiar principles guiding judicial review and construction of stat-
utes, each of which courts have relied upon in deciding severability cases.
These interrelated principles include: (1) statutes should be construed to
avoid constitutional questions; 229 (2) statutes are presumed to be constitu-
tional;1 0 (3) a constitutional construction of a statute should be adopted
surprising.... The issue, however, is not whether some Congressmen favored it, or even that it
was voted for, but whether it was essential to secure passage of the Act." Atkins v. United States,
556 F.2d, 1028, 1086 (Cl. Ct. 1977) (Skelton, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
229. See, e.g., Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 677 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 937 F.2d 1118, 1122 (6th Cir. 1991). See generally
EsKRDoGE & FcicrEY, supra note 131, at 599-600 (describing application of rule in other con-
texts). For criticism of this approach, see Note, Severability, supra note 6, at 1194 ("Preserving
the administrative infrastructure is an institutional concern as important as minimizing constitu-
tional adjudication.").
230. See, e.g., Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 530 P.2d 605, 617 (Cal. 1975) (en
banc) (quoting In re Blaney, 184 P.2d 892, 900 (Cal. 1947)); SuTHERLAND, supra note 3, at 480 &
n.3; Stern, supra note 3, at 120. By contrast, Cooley and one early court asserted that the pre-
sumption of constitutionality attaches only to entire acts, not to parts of them. See Skagit County
v. Stiles, 39 P. 116, 116 (Wash. 1894); CooLEY, supra note 3, at 248 n.1. This is little different,
however, from the claim rejected above that all statutes must be treated as an inviolable whole.
See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
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versus an unconstitutional construction of the statute whenever possible;231
(4) a court should give effect to a statute to the maximum extent permitted
by the Constitution; 32 and (5) a court should strike down only what is
necessary.233 Each of these general principles suggests that a court should
invalidate as little of a statute as possible unless the statute indicates that the
legislature intended a contrary result.234
The empirical realities of the legislative process also support a rule
favoring severability. I submit that in most cases the legislature prefers to
save as much of a statute as possible. The regularity with which legisla-
tures include severability clauses in statutes, and the infrequency with
which they include nonseverability clauses, bears witness to this prefer-
ence.23 5 For example, there has long been a reluctance to hold tax statutes
nonseverable. 6 Likewise, in areas where the legislature chafes at constitu-
231. See, e.g., El Paso & Northeastern R.R. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909); see also
Stem, supra note 3, at 120 (stating that in later severability cases "the court did not appear to be
bound by any presumption" of severability).
232. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1971);
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131 (1970); Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Utah 1982); Senate Chadha Hearings, supra note 6, at 123 (testi-
mony of Louis Fisher); SurnmRL., supra note 3, at 480 & n.5.
233. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468
U.S. at 652; Ackerley Communications v. City of Somerville, 878 F.2d 513, 522 (1st Cir. 1989);
McAlpine v. University of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 94 (Alaska 1988); Ewing v. Scotts Bluff County
Bd. of Equalization, 420 N.W.2d 685, 691 (Neb. 1988). As Judge Cardozo wrote, "Our right to
destroy is bounded by the limits of necessity. Our duty is to save unless in saving we pervert."
People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 129 N.E. 202,208 (N.Y. 1920), cert. denied,
256 U.S. 702 (1921). This is quoted as "the general rule" in National Advertising Co. v. Town of
Niagara, 942 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1991).
234. Justice White's opinion in Regan v. Time, Inc. contains the fullest expression of these
principles in a severability case:
In exercising its power to review the constitutionality of a legislative act, a federal court
should act cautiously. A ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected
representatives of the people. Therefore, a court should refrain from invalidating more
of the statute than is necessary. As this Court has observed, "whenever an act of Con-
gress contains unobjectionable provisions separable from those found to be unconstitu-
tional, it is the duty of this court to so declare, and to maintain the act in so far as it is
valid."
468 U.S. at 652 (plurality opinion of White, J.) (quoting El Paso & Northeastern R.R. v. Gutierrez,
215 U.S. at 96). See generally Surnanr.ND, supra note 3, at 480 (describing rules of statutory
construction from which principle of severability derives).
235. In contrast to the innumerable federal cases involving severability clauses, there have
been very few cases in which a nonseverability clause was present. See supra note 203 and
accompanying text. Presumably, one could argue that the legislature includes a severability clause
when it wants a statute to be severable, but I am not aware of any instance in which the failure to
include a severability clause was purposeful. The Court was right when it said in Alaska Airlines
that "[i]n the absence of a severability clause ... Congress' silence is just that-silence-and
does not raise a presumption against severability." 480 U.S. at 686.
236. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 696-97 (1892) ("Unless it be impossible to avoid it, a
general revenue statute should never be declared inoperable in all its parts because a particular
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tional restrictions on its power, it is often apparent that the legislature in-
tended a statute to remain operative to the extent constitutionally
permissible. 37 Moreover, the way Congress writes legislation implies that
it normally expects statutes to be severable. Congress' proclivity to enact
multititle, omnibus acts covering a host of matters supports the presumption
that Congress does not intend the invalidation of one part of a statute to
invalidate the entire act." 8
The contrary empirical argument for a rule favoring nonseverability is
that most legislation is a bundle of compromises, so that the legislature
generally prefers all or nothing in order to prevent the quid from being
separated from the quo.2 39 Certainly, there are instances in which sever-
ance of an unconstitutional statutory provision threatens the result achieved
during the drafting of a statute. Legislative vetoes are the most prominent
example. Many have argued that when Congress delegates power to the
executive but establishes a legislative veto to allow further legislative re-
view of the executive use of that power, the invalidation of the veto without
also invalidating the delegation upsets the compromise.240 Likewise, the
part relating to a distinct subject may be invalid."); Hayes, supra note 3, at 142 ("[It is reason-
able to suppose that the legislature meant [revenue] lavs to operate as fully as might be possi-
ble."). Attorney General Mitchell expressed a contrary view in 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 56, 66 (1933),
where he wrote that "[i]f the Congress makes an appropriation attaching to it an invalid condition,
we would hardly be justified in rejecting the condition as void and treating the appropriation as
available. The safe course is to treat the two as inseparable." Id. at 66.
237. For severability decisions holding capital punishment provisions severable, see United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585-91 (1968); People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181, 190 (Colo.
1992). Similarly, with some exceptions, courts have held abortion statutes severable. See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 978 F.2d 74, 76-78 (3d Cir. 1992); Guam Soc. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1992); Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d
1532, 1545 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 484 U.S. 171 (1987). But see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 83-84 (1976); Ragsdale v. Tumock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1375 (9th Cir. 1988), appeal
dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1309 (1992). For other decisions recognizing that the legislature wanted part
of a statute to operate if the whole statute could not be given effect, see New York v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2434 (1992); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 496, 506-07
(1985) ("It would be frivolous to suggest.., that the Washington Legislature, if it could not
proscribe materials that appealed to normal as well as abnormal sexual appetites, would have
refrained from passing the moral nuisance statute."); General Elec. Co. v. New York State Dep't
of Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1461 (2d Cir. 1991).
238. See Senate Chadha Hearings, supra note 6, at 41 (testimony of Michael Davidson).
239. Under this view, a fundamental purpose of severability analysis should be to preserve the
bargains legislators made. See Note, The Aftermath of Chadha, supra note 6, at 1212-13, 1217,
1220, 1223. The argument thus draws on public choice theory, which sees the legislative process
as a collection of individuals seeking to maximize their own interests. See Farber & Frickey, supra
note 138, at 878.
240. This charge was leveled both against Chadha, see House Chadha Hearings, supra note 6,
at 138 (statement of Rep. Berman) ("[Imt's hard for me to envision a statutory enactment that
probably couldn't be viewed as fully operative, even though the legislative veto was struck down.
It would just be a different kind of operation that Congress contemplated."); Senate Chadha Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 36 (testimony of Stanley Brand) ("[U]nder the judicial rubric of severabil-
1993] SEVERABILITY 253
dissent in Ontario Hockey Association argued that conditioning the general
prohibition on sex discrimination by restricting its application to amateur
hockey was an essential part of the legislative compromise." 1
The furor provoked by Chadha, however, suggests that legislative ve-
toes and other provisions that are essential to the legislative bargain are the
exception, not the rule. The courts have been holding statutes severable
with increasing regularity for years, and no one has objected. Fashioning a
severability rule to accommodate these exceptional cases would likely pro-
voke a similar outcry as soon as the invalidity of an insignificant part of a
continuing appropriations statute, or an agency's authorization statute,
caused the whole to fall. The relationship of most statutory provisions
points toward severability, rather than nonseverability. 24
2. What Kind of Rule Favoring Severability?
The Court's recent statutory construction cases suggest two types of
general rules in the severability context: a presumption of severability or a
clear statement rule. A presumption of severability would impose either the
burden of proof or the burden of persuasion on the advocates of nonsever-
ability.243 If the legislature's actual intent regarding severability should be
ity, the congressional quid goes the way of all flesh, while the unreviewable executive quid
remains intact."), and against Alaska Airlines; see Eskridge & Ferejoh, supra note 9, at 558-59
(arguing that Congress would not have enacted the statute absent the legislative veto and that the
Court separated the quid from the quo); id. at 563 (arguing that Chadha, Alaska Airlines and
Chevron reversed congressional expectations in striking statutory deals).
241. In re Blainey & Ontario Mackey Ass'n, 26 D.L.RAth 728, 753 (1986).
242. Professors Benno Schmidt and Alexander Bickel offered several additional justifications
for a rule favoring nonseverability. Defending the rule applied by the Court in Butts v. Merchants
& Miners Transp. Co., 230 U.S. 126, 133-38 (1913), which held that a federal civil rights act
could not be applied in territories because such an application was nonseverable from the uncon-
stitutional application in states, they argued that the rule was "highly deferential, because it re-
duced the element of judgment to virtually nothing." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNo C.
SclmiDT, JR., THE O van WENDELL Houvms DEviSE HISTORY OF TM SUPREME CouRT: Tin
JUDICIARY AND REsPo NSmLE GovmuMEnrr, 1910-1921 772 (1984). Schmidt and Bickel further
endorsed the Butts rule as "promot[ing] fairness to those who might be caught in the tattered
remains of a torn statutory web, predictability for the legal system, tidiness in the statute books,
and continuing legislative assessment of the costs and benefits of particular legislative policies."
ld. at 774. Of course, a rule that statutes are always severable would achieve similar results. For
example, the legislature's ability to "correct' a court's severability decision has been used as a
justification for a rule favoring severability. See Note, Severability, supra note 6, at 1196 (arguing
for the general rule that favoring severability is appropriate because "[i]f Congress decides that
the statute should not survive without its [legislative] veto provision, Congress is free to repeal
the statute"); see also Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 685 (1895) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (observing that new legislation might be enacted to ameliorate any harsh effects of
enforcing only a portion of a statute).
243. A burden of proof is "the necessity or duty of affirmatively proving a fact or facts in
dispute on an issue raised between the parties in a cause." BLAcK's Law DICrIONARY 196 (6th
ed. 1990). A party has the burden of persuasion when "[t]he onus [is] on the party with the
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
decisive, then the amount of evidence required to demonstrate that the leg-
islature intended nonseverability need not be great. Such evidence could be
gleaned from the statute's structure, purpose, or history. Where there is no
evidence of legislative intent regarding severability-as is often the case-
then the statute would be held severable because of the failure to produce
any evidence of nonseverability necessary to satisfy the burden the pre-
sumption of severability imposes. Thus, a general presumption of sever-
ability that imposed a burden of proof or persuasion would often be
dispositive for a court. 2 It would also instruct the legislature about what
to expect if it fails to include a severability or nonseverability clause in the
statute.
But a presumption of severability constructed along these lines suffers
from a critical weakness. A presumption may be overcome by evidence
that the legislature actually intended a statute to be nonseverable, thus ne-
cessitating an examination of a statute's structure, purpose, and legislative
history for evidence of the statute's severability. Because these sources are
frequently subject to conflicting interpretations, and because in many in-
stances the legislature probably never considered the issue, the undertaking
remains somewhat speculative. Defining what kind of evidence, and how
much of it, would be necessary to overcome a general presumption of sev-
erability is a difficult task. What would the court in Ontario Hockey Asso-
ciation need to know, for example, in order to overcome a presumption that
the Ontario legislature intended the exception for amateur sports to be sev-
erable from the general prohibition on sex discrimination?245 The procliv-
ity of courts to read the same evidence in different ways suggests that a
presumption may not eliminate the guesswork from deciding severability.
The creation of a clear statement rule for severability would avoid any
need to speculate about legislative intent or to consult these frequently in-
conclusive sources.' 4 A clear statement rule would treat all statutory pro-
burden of proof to convince the trier of fact of all elements of his case." Id. As explained in the
text, however, neither rule would achieve the results desired here.
244. As one writer observed, "if any presumption is recognized, this may be of prime im-
portance since there may be little to indicate legislative intent .... ." Hayes, supra note 2, at 140.
245. See supra notes 26, 216-23 and accompanying text.
246. Eskridge and Frickey contrast "presumptions" and "clear statement rules" as follows:
"Presumptions" of interpretation are general policies the Court will "presume" Congress
intends to incorporate into statutes. Presumptions can be rebutted by persuasive argu-
ments that the statutory text, legislative history, or purpose is inconsistent with the pre-
sumptions. "Clear statement rules" require a "clear statement" on the face of the statute
to rebut a policy presumption the Court has created.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 145, at 595 n.4. They identify another category that they label
"super-strong clear statement rules," which they say "seem to require very specifically targeted
'clear statements' on the face of the statute.' Id. Because the distinction between "super-strong"
clear statement rules and "ordinary" clear statement rules makes little difference in the context of
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visions as severable unless the legislature clearly states in the text of the
statute its intention that a statutory provision is nonseverable. Because a
clear statement rule "foreclose[s] inquiry into extrinsic guides of interpreta-
tion," 7 it would eliminate any need to glean evidence from the structure,
purpose, or history of a statute to inform a prediction about the legislature's
intent regarding severability. Any confusion about whether such evidence
is sufficient to overcome an indefinite presumption is thus avoided.
The Court has increasingly relied upon judicially established clear
statement rules as part of its approach to statutory construction. 48 The
Court has declared this necessary for "the protection of weighty and con-
stant values, be they constitutional, or otherwise."' 49 Such values have in-
cluded the immunity of states from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, 2 0
"protect[ing] against unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord,"'" and "con-
straining judicial discretion in the interpretation of the laws. ' '2 2 In addi-
tion, Professors Eskridge and Frickey have outlined a theory of how clear
statement rules can operate to "articulate and protect underenforced consti-
tutional norms."'" 3
Severability fits within this framework. Requiring the legislature to
state clearly its intention that a statute be treated as nonseverable would
promote the general principles listed above, counseling caution in invalidat-
ing any part of a statute. These values are akin to those the Court has
protected with other clear statement rules. Although it can be debated
severability, in which a statute either contains a provision directly aimed at severability or it does
not, this Article refers only to "clear statement rules."
247. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1238 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
248. For a comprehensive description of the development of the Court's jurisprudence of clear
statement rules, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 145, at 593. They observe that "consistent
with its interest in textualism as its dominant interpretive methodology, the current Court empha-
sizes clear statement rules much more than presumptions." Id. at 597.
249. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2170 (1991) (citations
omitted). Generally, "[iun traditionally sensitive areas .... the requirement of clear statement
assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters
involved in the judicial decision." Il (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
Examples of clear statement rules the Court has established include United States v. Nordic Vil-
lage, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1014 (1992) (requiring clear statement of waiver of sovereign immu-
nity); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2403 (1991) (requiring clear statement of
congressional regulation of core state functions); Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1230 (requir-
ing clear statement of extraterritorial effect of a statute); and Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (requiring clear statement of abrogation of state sovereign immunity).
250. See Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 243.
251. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
252. Astoria Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. at 2170 (describing basis for clear state-
ment rule against repeals by implication established by Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551
(1974)).
253. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 145, at 631.
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whether these values are "underenforced" by the Court today, the mixed
judicial record in heeding the legislature's own attempts to assure severabil-
ity counsels that the Court would be justified in adopting a clear statement
rule for severability. Also, severability presents the same kind of "yes or
no" question answered by other clear statement rules that ask whether sov-
ereign immunity has been waived or whether a statute should apply
extraterritorially.
Admittedly, the Court's creation of clear statement rules has been sub-
ject to criticism. Critics have questioned the Court's presumed authority to
require an extraordinary expression of legislative intent in those areas that
the Court finds special." 4 As Justice Marshall noted, "[c]lear statement
rules operate less to reveal actual congressional intent than to shield impor-
tant values from an insufficiently strong legislative intent to displace
them." 5  Although there is a strong argument that the values protected by
a clear statement rule for severability justify such a rule, a still better way to
decide severability remains.
The legislature can create a clear statement rule by enacting a general
severability clause providing that all statutes should be treated as severable
unless they contain a nonseverability clause specifically stating otherwise.
Indeed, Maryland" 6 and Minnesota 7 have provisions similar to this,
254. For an account of the countermajoritarian concerns raised by the establishment of clear
statement rules by the Court, see id at 636-40. One of these concerns does not apply to severabil-
ity: that a clear statement rule "make[s] it quite hard for Congress to express its expectations
even when it is focusing on the issue." Id at 638. It would be easy for Congress to draft a
nonseverability clause that would overcome a clear statement rule for severability. Other con-
cerns about clear statement rules are expressed in Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U.
Cm-. L. Ray. 533, 545 (1983) ("mhe 'clear statement' principle usually fails as a useful tool of
construction because it cannot demonstrate why the legislature would have wanted the court to
hesitate just because the subject matter of the law is 'sensitive.' Likely it thinks that making hard
decisions in sensitive areas is what courts are for." (footnote omitted)) and Jerry L. Mashaw,
Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 827, 835 (1991) (considering the argument that clear statement rules "describe a disfunction-
ally 'acontextual' view of the power of language").
255. Arabian Arm. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1238 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
256. Maryland's statute provides:
The provisions of all statutes enacted after July 1, 1973, are severable unless the
statute specifically provides that its provisions are not severable. The finding by a court
that some provision of a statute is unconstitutional and void does not affect the validity
of the remaining portions of that statute, unless the court finds that the remaining valid
provisions alone are incomplete and incapable of being executed in accordance with the
legislative intent.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 23 (1992) (emphasis added). For a decision following this clause, see
State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening, 617 A.2d 586, 589-90 (Md. 1993).
257. Minnesota's statute provides:
Unless there is a provision in the law that the provisions shall not be severable, the
provisions of all laws shall be severable. If any provision of a law is found to be
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although both statutes are conditioned in a manner that undercuts their
force." 8 Maryland's statute has the further virtue of explicitly stating that
it applies only prospectively. Alas, general severability clauses have suf-
fered from even greater neglect than severability clauses contained in spe-
cific statutes.' 9 For example, in Muller v. Curran, the court refused to
believe that the legislature intended severance despite Maryland's clear
statement rule and a specific severability clause in the statute.260 But if a
general severability clause like Maryland's or Minnesota's were construed
according to its plain meaning, as advocated here, such a provision would
operate as a legislatively established clear statement rule in favor of sever-
ability. If the Ontario legislature had enacted such a provision, then section
unconstitutional and void, the remaining provisions of the law shall remain valid, unless
the court finds the valid provisions of the law are so essentially and inseparably con-
nected with, and so dependent upon, the void provisions that the court cannot presume
the legislature would have enacted the remaining provisions without the valid one; or
unless the court finds the remaining valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and
incapable of being executed in accordance with legislative intent.
MIN. STAT. ANm. § 645.20 (West 1992) (emphasis added). For decisions of the Minnesota
courts applying this clause, see New Creative Enters., Inc. v. Dick Hume & Assocs. Inc., 494
N.W.2d 508, 512 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Schieck v. State, 442 N.W.2d 359, 361-62 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989).
258. The general severability clause recommended by this Article would include only the first
sentence of each provision. It would not include the language in the balance of each provision
inviting a court to judge whether severance can be accomplished "in accordance with legislative
intent." Rather, the only situation in which a plain statutory directive would not control would be
if the application of the general severability clause would produce an absurd result. See supra
note 150 and accompanying text.
259. Alaska's general severability clause, for example, creates only "a weak presumption in
favor of severability." Sonneman v. Hickel, 836 P.2d 936, 941 (Alaska 1992); accord People ex
rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 558 N.E.2d 89, 97 (111. 1990) (noting that
general severability statutes carry less weight than severability clauses attached to specific stat-
utes). Other general severability clauses are treated as merely creating a presumption of severabil-
ity. See Manufacturers Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper, 801 F.2d 130, 136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987) (construing 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1925 (Supp. 1986)); Trade
Waste Management Ass'n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 1985 (construing N.J. STAT.
ANN. 1:10 (West 1992)); Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (N.D.
Ga. 1990) (construing GA. CODE ANN. § 1-1-3 (1990)).
260. 889 F.2d 54, 57 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990). Likewise, Frickey
ignores Minnesota's general severability clause in discussing the severability of an arguably un-
constitutional delegation of power. He writes that
the Minnesota scheme makes it impossible to sort out the severability puzzle. There is
no meaningful way to ascertain whether any Minnesota statute delegating rule-making
authority would have passed without the LCRAR suspension authority lurking in the
background, particularly since the Minnesota Legislature, like many state legislatures,
prepares no formal legislative history.
Philip P. Fnickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative Committee Suspension of Administrative
Rules: The Case of Minnesota, 70 MINN. L. RE,. 1237, 1261 (1986) (footnote omitted). Frickey
does not mention Minnesota's general severability provision, which should easily govern the case
he described.
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19(2) of the Human Rights Code (the exception for amateur sports) would
be severable from section 1 (the general prohibition against sex discrimina-
tion) because the Code does not contain a specific nonseverability clause.
Ascertaining the legislature's intent regarding severability would be that
simple with a legislatively enacted clear statement rule.
V]. CONCLUSION
The prevailing view toward severability is that the question of the sev-
erability of unconstitutional statutory provisions merits a different analysis
of legislative intent. The thesis of this Article is that the issue of severabil-
ity is no different than other questions of statutory construction. The practi-
cal differences between these approaches are not always great. Many
severability cases are easy because most statutes are obviously severable.
Therefore, it may not make a difference whether one examines the plain
meaning of the statutory text or speculates about what the legislature would
have done if it had anticipated the severability problem. Courts are thus
able to reach the correct result in many cases when they employ the current
test. The inadequacy of Alaska Airlines is not apparent until a difficult
severability case, such as Ontario Hockey Association, arises, in which it is
difficult to know what the legislature would have done. When a severabil-
ity clause is viewed with indifference and the effect of any presumptions is
unknown, and when the remaining sources of insight into legislative intent
regarding severability produce only a guess about what the legislature
would have done, the weakness of the Alaska Airlines test becomes evident.
The rule favoring severability that this Article proposes would provide
an understandable baseline from which the legislature and the courts can
decide severability questions. As Professor Cynthia Farina has written,
"ITihe choice of interpretive model is ultimately a choice about allocating
power, the power that results from ambiguity. When Congress has failed to
speak clearly or comprehensively, who gets to decide what the law is?"26
The lack of clear standards in the current test effectively vests that power in
the courts. The rule advocated here would make the consequences of ambi-
guity certain-the statute is severable. By establishing a rule pursuant to
which statutory provisions are deemed severable absent a specific legisla-
tive statement to the contrary, this proposal substitutes a coherent theory for
the existing intuitive assumption that most statutes are severable. This is
not to say, however, that the legislature should be discouraged from indicat-
ing that certain statutes are not severable. Some statutory provisions are the
product of compromises that would be disrupted if one part was allowed to
261. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administra-
tive State, 89 COLuM. L. Rnv. 452, 464 (1989).
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stand as another part fell; such statutes should be nonseverable. The best
way of assuring that result is to include a nonseverability clause in the stat-
ute itself.
In many respects, Chief Justice Hughes modeled the approach advo-
cated here. Writing in dissent from the Court's finding of nonseverability
in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., he first explained that "[t]his is admittedly a
question of statutory construction; and hence we must search for the intent
of Congress. And in seeking that intent we should not fail to give full
weight to what Congress itself has said upon the very point."262 He then
rejected the guesswork inherent in the Court's approach:
I do not think that the question of separability should be deter-
mined by trying to imagine what Congress would have done if
certain provisions found to be invalid were excised. That, if taken
broadly, would lead us into a realm of pure speculation. Who can
tell amid the host of divisive influences playing upon the legisla-
tive body what its reaction would have been to a particular exci-
sion required by a finding of invalidity? The question does not
call for speculation of that sort but rather for an inquiry whether
the provisions are inseparable by virtue of inherent character.
That is, when Congress states that the provisions of the Act are
not inseparable and that the invalidity of any provision shall not
affect others, we should not hold that the provisions are insepara-
ble unless their nature, by reason of an inextricable tie, demands
that conclusion.263
Thus, he concluded that "the express provisions of the Act preclude such a
finding of inseparability." 2
The approach proposed by this Article goes a step further than Chief
Justice Hughes because of the difficulty in deciding severability when no
severability clause is present. A rule favoring severability, especially a
clear statement rule, would guide both the courts and the legislatures in
making decisions about severability. With such clear guidance, severability
would no longer be a matter of speculation.
262. 298 U.S. 238, 321 (1936) (Hughes, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
263. Il at 321-22.
264. Id. Hughes also wrote that a severability clause "is a declaration which reverses the
presumption of indivisibility and creates an opposite presumption." Id. at 321; see also Electric
Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 434 (1938) ("[Wlhen validity is in question, divisibility
and not integration is the guiding principal.") The balance of his opinion and his other opinions
demonstrate that he viewed a severability clause as doing much more than establishing a burden of
persuasion. See Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 389 (1935) (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting), overruled by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 62-63 (1932), overruled by, Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini N.
River Assoc., 459 U.S. 297 (1983).
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